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"Credulity is a greater evil in the present day 
than it ever was before, because, owing to 
the growth of education, it is much easier 
than it used to be to spread misinformation, 
and, owing to democracy, the spread of 
misinformation is more important than in 
former times to the holders of power" 
Bertrand Russell 
 
  
  
 
  
  
Executive Summary 
 
This report analyses citizens’ vulnerabilities to disinformation and hostile narratives, taking the 
2018 Italian General Election as a case study. 
Manipulated information, using a mix of emotionality and rationality, has recently become so 
pervasive and powerful to the extent of rewriting reality, when spread in an environment where 
the narration of facts (true, partial or false) counts more than the facts themselves.  
Disinformation greatly differs from “fake news”, which has been mainly used by politicians as a 
derogatory term to label news sources that allegedly do not support their positions. 
Nevertheless, studies have shown that false stories are diffused faster, farther and deeper than 
any other type of information. Coordinated disinformation campaigns tend to exploit the inner 
weaknesses of social platforms in order to reach the targeted audience with absolute accuracy.  
Until a few years ago, the sources of information were numerous but controllable. The system 
was centralized, with a one-way transmission system (sender-receiver), which could reach a 
large number of people not connected to each other. Nowadays, with internet platforms, the 
geography of communication coincides with the boundaries of the platform itself. Therefore, 
through a limited number of passages, information may reach very distant points and in a few 
hours can became viral, regardless of its correctness.  
Technological advances have provided producers and sharer of distorted information with new 
powerful means to reach an ever-wider audience. Social networks, in fact, are able to attract 
and engage millions of people by giving them a platform where disinformation can spread 
exponentially fast, often being uncritically picked-up and redistributed to an even larger 
audience by traditional media. Those platforms were in principle neutral. However, they came 
to acquire a greater socio-economic value, and became a powerful tool that politicians quickly 
learned to exploit to address citizens directly, raising new questions concerning the relationship 
between classical mediation institutes of representative democracy. 
Every day, an incredible amount of information is constantly produced on the web. Its diffusion 
is driven by algorithms, originally conceived for the commercial market, and then maliciously 
exploited for manipulative purposes and to build consensus, resulting in the creation of what 
experts defined as “echo chambers”, where users are confronted only with similar opinion, 
rapidly leading to extreme polarization.  
Fast technological advances and the pervasiveness of Internet connectivity in shaping public 
opinion have also dramatically changed the scope, directness and the scale of hostile external 
interference. Disinformation operations in foreign countries are nothing new and have been a 
weapon of strategic importance in the arsenal of states for centuries. However, cyberspace is 
now being used as a powerful platform to destabilize targeted countries through manipulated 
content, which can be disseminated with a multiplier effect because of its high connectivity, 
low latency, low cost of entry, and a total disregard for physical distance or national borders. 
  
  
This report will argue that today's society vulnerability to disinformation operations is not only 
the result of the threats posed by hostile actors or psychometric profiling - which can be seen 
as both exploiters and facilitators - but essentially due to the effect of three different factors:  
 Information overload; 
 Distorted public perceptions produced by online platforms algorithms built for viral 
advertising and user engagement;  
 The complex iteration of fast technology development, globalisation, and post-
colonialism, which have rapidly changed the rules-based international order.  
The new technological gatekeepers of social reality - which have thrived under few rules, 
virtually escaping state control - have established forms of de-territorialized citizenship, which 
is slowly replacing some of the fundamental functions of the nation state.  
Governments are increasingly perceived as controlled by external forces, exercising only partial 
influence over national affairs, thus echoing a situation that we see often in world's poorest 
countries. This feeling of primitive vulnerability is terrifying the West, leaving its populations 
shattered and bereft.  
Once considered to have the potential to bridge gaps and unite communities geographically 
separated, information technology seems paradoxically also to have the power to divide groups 
and fragment interaction, making it easier for people to screen out unwanted contact or 
information. With the resurgence of tribal identities, geographical boundaries are being 
supplanted by digital boundaries, and further reflected into society. The effect is not merely a 
tendency to conform to the group average, but a radicalisation in which such average moves 
toward the extremes.  
In recent times, disinformation strategies have evolved from “hack and dump” cyber-attacks, 
and randomly sharing conspiracy or made-up stories, into a more complex ecosystem where 
narratives are used to feed people with emotionally charged true and false information, ready 
to be “weaponised” when necessary.  
The coordinated action of disinformation and data-driven propaganda aims at displacing 
aspirations with anger born from confusion and despair, destroying social cohesion. In more 
recent years, Europe has seen a resurgence of identitarian ideology, associated to the political 
success of populist movements. Their narrative is powerful because it appears inclusive, simple 
and comprehensible, offering solutions to fears that it has helped generate. All these factors 
have resulted in citizens' strong demand for security, which has produced a shift towards social 
authoritarianism and unfold a ferocious critique of cultural liberalism. 
Chapter One will examine the evolution of information disorder and distortion of public 
perceptions. Chapter Two will draw a parallel between current times and the impact of the 15th 
century printing revolution. Chapter Three will address citizens' vulnerabilities to disinformation 
campaigns and their effects. Chapter Four will analyse Russian "active measures", while 
Chapter Five will outline the coordinated actions taken by the EU institutions to tackle 
disinformation. Finally, Chapter Six will be devoted to the case study on the 2018 Italian 
General Election, where the use of narratives and the exploitation of online platforms’ 
algorithms have contributed to an unprecedented political result.  
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1. Introduction 
Society has always been exposed to disinformation. One of the most ancient examples dates 
back to the end of the Roman Republic. After Julius Caesar death in March 44BC, Octavian and 
Marc Anthony – respectively adopted son and closest friend of Julius Cesar – emerged as the 
two contenders for power. What followed was an unequalled disinformation war involving 
poetry, rhetoric and the use of short and sharp slogans pressed on coins, in a way that may be 
considered as a predecessor of Twitter1.  
Despite his young age, Octavian proved to be an excellent propaganda strategist. He depicted 
his opponent as a soldier gone awry, a philanderer, womaniser, a depraved sexual addict, a 
drunk corrupted by Cleopatra, thus not fit to lead.2 He then claimed to have stolen Marc 
Anthony’s official will and testament, most probably fabricated, and read to the Senate its 
provisions that allegedly included the recognition of Cesareon as the true son of Caesar, vast 
legacy to Cleopatra’s children, and the move of the seat of power from Rome to Alexandria3.  
His disinformation campaign played on so many anti-eastern prejudice of ancient Romans, who 
feared the wealth and luxuries of the eastern regions as a direct threat to the traditional 
customs (Mos Maiorum),4 and successfully depicted Marc Anthony as “a degenerate Roman 
who was striving to subvert the liberties of the Roman people to subjugate Italy and the west 
under the rule of an oriental queen”, having the Senate declare him an enemy of the State.5 
In the early years of the XX century, states heavily relied on propaganda and disinformation to 
advance political goals. During the First World War, the British government used propaganda to 
keep the population motivated against Germany, while in the 1930s, Nazi party used newly 
mass media technology to consolidate its power, using racial stereotyping to encourage 
discrimination against Jews.6  
In more recent times, online disinformation has evolved from a nuisance confined in obscure 
online forums, into a powerful tool for hybrid-warfare, organised into hostile narratives.7 
In a cyberspace that William Gibson8 once described as "a consensual hallucination experienced 
daily by billions of legitimate operators in every nation",9 hostile narratives target feelings and 
emotions and touch upon particular social vulnerabilities. They are made by true and false 
                                           
1 Izabella Kaminska, A lesson in fake news from the info-wars of ancient Rome, Financial Times, 17 January 2017. 
2 Bernadotte Perrin, Plutarch's Lives, Harvard University Press. 1920. 
3 Frank Sirianni, Was Anthony's Will Partially Forged?, L'Antiquité Classique, n.  53, 1984. 
4 The mos maiorum were collectively the time-honoured principles, behavioural models, and social practices that 
affected private, political, and military life in ancient Rome. 
5 Mario Attilio Levi, La lotta per la successione di Giulio Cesare e l'avvento di Ottaviano Augusto, Milano: Vita e 
Pensiero, 1939. 
6 James Carson, What is fake news? Its origins and how it grew in 2016, The Telegraph, 17 June 2017. 
7 Flemming Splidsboel Hansen, Russian Hybrid Warfare: A Study of Disinformation, ETH Center for Security Studies, 
September 2017. 
8 William Ford Gibson is an American-Canadian writer and essayist widely credited with pioneering the science-
fiction subgenre known as cyberpunk. 
9 William Gibson, Neuromancer, Berkley Pub. Group, New York, 1984. 
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information, where the narration of facts counts more than the facts themselves. The different 
narratives may appear in contradiction one with the other, as they address different population 
groups. Individuals pick and choose the story elements that make sense to them, accepting a 
portion of misleading information. 
Hostile narratives, organised per themes, are primarily based on social issues, and cross-
platform shared in order to enhance virality. Topics are presented to reinforce community and 
cultural pride, exploiting the tribalism within each targeted community. They are designed to 
erode trust in mainstream media and institutions. Most of the content used to build these 
hostile narratives is not always objectively false. Much of it is not even classifiable as hate 
speech, but it is intended to reinforce tribalism, to polarize and divide, specifically designed to 
exploit social fractures, creating a distorted perception of reality by eroding the trust in media, 
institutions and eventually, democracy itself.10 
Over the past fifteen years, social media companies have become enormous corporations that 
make money by harvesting the data from its users. Their algorithms, designed to maximize user 
engagement, cannot prevent the recrudescence of racism, sexism, and intolerance, on the 
contrary they bring that to a global scale.11  
Following pressure from institutions, platforms have announced initiatives to shift their 
algorithmic ranking of content towards more visibility for "quality", or the prompt removal of 
account suspected of sharing disinformation or hostile propaganda; 12 however, they have not 
provided enough detail for an evaluation of its effectivity.13  
 
1.1 Disinformation, Misinformation, and Distorted Perceptions 
Disinformation14 has been defined as “false, inaccurate or misleading information designed, 
presented and promoted to intentionally cause public harm or for profit”.15 There is a slight 
difference between disinformation and misinformation, with the latter defined as “incorrect 
information that is spread, regardless of whether there is intent to mislead”.16 
According to Professor Eric Cheyfitz,17 disinformation is “the process of erasing history, 
culminating in a disruption or blockage of critical thinking”, or a “constant unlearning of the 
                                           
10 Renee DiResta, Dr. Kris Shaffer, Becky Ruppel, David Sullivan, Robert Matney, Ryan Fox, Jonathan Albright, Ben 
Johnson, The Tactics & Tropes of the Internet Research Agency, New Knowledge, 17 Dec 2018. 
11 Fred Turner, The rise of the internet and a new age of authoritarianism, Harper's Magazine, 4 March 2019. 
12 Jen Weedon, William Nuland, Alex Stamos, Information Operations and Facebook, Facebook Security, 27 April 
2017. 
13 European Commission, Statement on the Code of Practice against disinformation: Commission asks online 
platforms to provide more details on progress made, 28 February 2019. 
14 From the Russian word “дезинформация" (dezinformacija), derived from the title of a KGB black propaganda 
department. Joseph Stalin allegedly coined the term, giving it a French-sounding name to claim it had a Western 
origin. (Ion Mihai Pacepa, Ronald J. Rychlak, Disinformation: Former Spy Chief Reveals Secret Strategies for 
Undermining Freedom, Attacking Religion, and Promoting Terrorism, WND Books, Washington, DC, 2013). 
15 European Commission, A multi-dimensional Approach to Disinformation, March 2018. 
16 Bernd Carsten Stahl, On the Difference or Equality of Information, Misinformation, and Disinformation: A Critical 
Research Perspective, Informing Science Journal, Volume 9, 2006. 
17 Eric Cheyfitz is professor of American Studies and Humane Letters at Cornell University. 
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facts”,18 as the ability to think critically is deeply linked to the ability to think historically. In this 
sense, disinformation mitigates the conscious processing of information, creating a structure 
where contradictions are not recognised. 19  
Disinformation greatly differs from “fake news”, which has been mainly used by politicians as a 
derogatory term to label news sources that do not support their positions.20 For this reason, the 
term has completely lost its connection with the actual veracity of the information presented.21  
A recent EuroBarometer survey (figure 1) reported that a large majority of European citizens 
believe they can identify fake stories;22 however research shows that public perceptions are 
often inaccurate, in particular on topics that are being widely discussed in the media.23 
 
Figure 1 - Source: Eurobarometer 
In a world overloaded with information, fake stories are designed to attract attention. Although 
many are visibly quite fantastical and implausible, they deceive the heuristic accuracy 
judgements, often impacting on personal beliefs and actions.  
Such mechanism has been defined as misperception. The notion refers to "factual beliefs that 
are false or contradict the best available evidence in the public domain. These beliefs may 
originate internally (e.g. as a result of cognitive biases or mistaken inferences) or with external 
sources (e.g. media coverage)".24 Misperception of the surrounding world has consequences on 
                                           
18 Slavoj Žižek, Trouble in Paradise: From the End of History to the End of Capitalism, Melville House, Brooklyn, NY, 
2014. 
19 Eric Cheyfitz, The disinformation age: the collapse of liberal democracy in the USA, Taylor&Francis Group, 2017. 
20 Donald Trump first used the term “fake news” in January 2017 to attack CNN journalist Jim Acosta. 
21 Soroush Vosoughi, Deb Roy, Sian Aral, The spread of trues and false news online, Science, vol. 359, March 2016. 
22 Eurobarometer Report, Fake news and disinformation online, Flash Eurobarometer 464, April 2018. 
23 Bobby Duffy, The Perils of Perception: Why We’re Wrong about Nearly Everything, Atlantic Books, 2018. 
24 Bobby Duffy, The Perils of Perception... 
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evaluations and subsequent decisions, because if perceptions are distorted, then evaluations 
will be groundless and decisions might be inadequate or counterproductive. People's opinion 
can be distorted on a wide array of issues and not necessarily because of ignorance or poor 
education.25 Misperceptions seems particularly common when debating politics, health and 
science,26 and may promote extremism and conflicts. Different elements, partly individual and 
partly contextual, contribute to misperception, as a large amount of people, unable to untangle 
themselves in the complexity of society, to reassure themselves and feel adequate, seek 
simplified explanations, often emotionality charged, that will help them feel what they cannot 
understand. 27 
People constantly exposed to massive amount of information, tend to trust opinions that were 
formed in and shaped by those groups that confirm pre-existing convictions, with an effect 
known as "bandwagoning".28 It is the “illusory truth effect", which is the mechanism that confers 
trustworthiness to stories via previous exposure, despite their low level of overall believability.29 
Repetition increases the ease with which statements are processed, which in turn is used 
heuristically to infer accuracy.30 Social psychology provided an explanation of this process, 
known as the Dunning-Kruger effect. The effect “is a cognitive bias in which individuals, who 
are unskilled at a particular task, believe themselves to possess above-average ability in 
performing the task. On the other hand, as individuals become more skilled in a particular task, 
they may mistakenly believe that they possess below-average ability in performing those tasks 
because they may assume that all others possess equal or greater ability”. 31 
Misperceptions interfere with two main “democratic competences”: heuristics and aggregation. 
The first is defined as "common judgmental shortcuts that people use to draw complicated 
                                           
25 Bobby Duffy, Why are people so often wrong about their own countries?, The Guardian, 2 December 2015. 
26  For example, misperception played an important role in Brexit debate. Citizens were in fact misinformed about 
the size of the immigrant population, and EU administrative costs. (Neil T Gavin, Media definitely do matter: Brexit, 
immigration, climate change and beyond, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol 20, Issue 
4, 2018). 
27 D.J. Flynn, Brendan Nyhan, Jason Reifler, The Nature and origins of Misperceptions: Understanding false and 
unsupported beliefs about politics, Advances in Political Psychology, Volume38, IssueS1, February 2017. 
28 Emanuele Baldacci, Dario Buono, Fabrice Gras, Fake News and information asymmetries: data as public good, 
Dataforpolicy.org, London, 2017. 
29 Ian  Maynard Begg, Ann Anas, Suzanne Farinacci, Dissociation of Processes in Belief: Source Recollection, 
Statement Familiarity, and the Illusion of Truth, Journal of Experimental Psychology, Vol. 121, No. 4.446-45, 1992. 
30 For more info: Adam L. Alter, Daniel M. Oppenheimer, Uniting the Tribes of Fluency to Form a Metacognitive 
Nation, Personality and Social Psychology Review,  Volume 13, Issue 3, August 2009; Lynn Hasher, David 
Goldstein, and Thomas Toppino, Frequency and the Conference of Referential Validity, Journal of Verbal Learning 
and Verbal Behavior, N. 16(1), February 1977; Rolf Reber, Piotr Winkielman, Norbert Schwarz, Effects of Perceptual 
Fluency on Affective Judgments, Psychological Science, Volume 9, Issue 1, January 1998; Christian Unkelbach, 
Reversing the Truth Effect: Learning the Interpretation of Processing Fluency in Judgments of Truth, Journal of 
Experimental Psychology Learning Memory and Cognition, n. 33(1), February 2007; Wei Chun Wang, Nadia 
Brashier, Erik Wing, Elizabeth Marsh, Roberto Cabeza, On Known Unknowns: Fluency and the Neural Mechanisms 
of Illusory Truth, Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, n. 28(5), January 2016; Bruce W. A. Whittlesea, Illusions of 
familiarity, Journal of Experimental Psychology Learning Memory and Cognition, n. 19(6), November 1993; 
Christian Unkelbach, Sarah C Rom, A referential theory of the repetition-induced truth effect, Cognition, n. 160, 
2017. 
31 Justin Kruger, David Dunning, Unskilled and Unaware of It: How Difficulties in Recognizing One’s Own 
Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self-Assessments, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, n. 77 (6), 1999. 
 5 
Active 
Misinformed 
Active 
Informed 
Inactive 
Misinformed 
Inactive 
Informed 
interference from simple environmental clues", while the latter focuses on the "aggregation of 
individual level preferences into collective public opinion".32  
In this context, heuristics is used when a person recognizes their lack of knowledge, but 
misperception can lead to wrong self-perception of being well-informed.33 Aggregation is used 
to balance random errors in individual level preferences, but in presence of systematic 
misperceptions, aggregation will magnify individual misinformation to public level.34 This can 
produce negative consequence for public debate, as politicians may be reluctant to listen to or 
engage with a widely misinformed constituency.35 
Scholars identified four categories of people participating in public debates (figure 2): 36  
The active misinformed pose 
more concern, as they not only 
hold an incorrect knowledge, but 
they are also publicly involved. In 
this particular case, corrective 
information fails to change their 
false beliefs, as people have 
difficulties to accept their 
information to be discredited.37  
Motivated reasoning theory38 
suggests that information 
selection is influenced by goals 
and "leads people to seek out 
information that reinforces their 
preferences (confirmation bias), 
counter-argue information that 
contradicts their preferences 
(disconfirmation bias), and view 
pro-attitudinal information as more convincing than counter-attitudinal information (prior 
attitude effect)".39 A main trigger to this kind of reasoning is identity threat: when a fact is 
                                           
32 Arthur Lupia, Mathew D. McCubbins, Samuel L. Popkin, Elements of Reason: Cognition, Choice, and the Bounds of 
Rationality, Cambridge University Press, Cambridege, 2000. 
33 David Dunning, The Dunning-Kruger effect: On being ignorant of one's own ignorance, in Advances in 
experimental social psychology, Vol. 44, Academic Press, San Diego, 2011. 
34 D.J. Flynn, Brendan Nyhan, Jason Reifler, The Nature and origins of Misperceptions: Understanding false and 
unsupported beliefs about politics, Advances in Political Psychology, Volume38, IssueS1, February 2017. 
35 Michael Honda, Misinformation Makes Town Hall Meetings Tough, The Mercury News, 8 September 2009. 
36 Jennifer L. Hochschild, Katherine Levine Einstein, Do Facts Matter? Information and Misinformation in American 
Politics, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 2015. 
37 John G. Bullock, Alan S. Gerber, Seth J. Hill, Gregory A. Huber, Partisan Bias in Factual Beliefs about Politics, 
Quarterly Journal of Political Science, n. 10, 2015. 
38 Ayelet Fishbach, Melissa Ferguson, The goal construct in social psychology, Social psychology: Handbook of 
basic principles, The Guilford Press, New York,  2007. 
39 Charles S. Taber, Milton Lodge, Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs, American Journal of 
Political Science, n. 50 (3), 2006. 
Figure 2 - Factual Beliefs in Public Opinion 
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perceived as threatening of one's identity, the most natural response is to resist it. This 
behaviour may be reinforced by groups' dynamics, when reasoning is influenced by the need of 
reinforcing existing loyalties rather than assessing the correctness of a fact.40 People can then 
agree with a false statement as a pure expressive response signalling support to a specific 
group or individual.41   
Recent studies have also assessed to what extent false stories are diffused faster, farther, and 
deeper than any other kind of information, often aided by their virality, characterized by a 
designed branching process.42 Exploiting platforms’ algorithms, falsehoods are often diffused 
online by accounts with small following, sometimes recently created, without affecting the 
spread effect. This can be explained because novelty attracts attention, contributes to 
understanding the world, helps decision-making, and encourages information sharing.43 
It has also been observed that “bad news” spread as more as they are loaded with strong 
negative emotions, like anger or fear, making them the perfect match for the construction of a 
hostile narrative. The “availability heuristics”44 makes people overestimate the frequency of 
negative events, while the confirmation bias pushes them to look for news, opinions and 
evidence that support what has already been convinced, and above all to ignore everything that 
conflicts with previous beliefs.45 For this reason, during political crises, social media users not 
only share content from reliable sources, but also extremist, sensationalist, conspiratorial, 
fraudulent, and other forms of unsubstantiated content.46  
  
                                           
40 Elizabeth Paluck, Hana Shepherd, The salience of social referents: A field experiment on collective norms and 
harassment behaviour in a school social network, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, n. 103 (6), 2012. 
41 Alan Gerber, Donald P. Green, Christopher W. Larimer, Social pressure and voter turnout: Evidence from a large-
scale field experiment, American Political Science Review, n. 102 (01), 2008. 
42 Soroush Vosoughi, Deb Roy, Sian Aral, The spread of trues and false news online, Science, vol. 359, Issue 6380, 
March 2016. 
43 James Druckman, Erik Peterson, Rune Slothuus, How Elite Partisan Polarization Affects Public Opinion Formation, 
American Political Science Review, n. 107 (1), 2013. 
44 The availability heuristic is a mental shortcut that relies on immediate examples that come to a given person's 
mind when evaluating a specific topic, concept, method or decision. 
45 Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, Science, Vol. 185, Issue 
4157, Sep 1974. 
46 Vidya Narayanan, Vlad Barash, John Kelly, Bence Kollanyi, Polarization, partisanship and junk news consumption 
over social media in the US, Comprop, February 2018. 
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1.1.1 A New Information Landscape 
 
"Today in the cyberspace a multilingual community lives with a very high 
degree of civilization, competence and tolerance. Maybe it will not always 
be this way. Maybe there will soon be some crazy splinters, some "pirates 
of the network" that will capture the flows of information, disrupt them, 
and make them unreliable" (Nicoletta Castagni, 1995) 
 
Nowadays a relatively small group of people can take advantage of social media interaction 
and algorithms to reach a wider public. Many began with the only objective to monetise 
visibility by publishing incredible stories using politically driven content. This was impossible 
before the internet, for three reasons:  
 Distribution was immensely expensive.  
 Building a large audience was slower as gaining the trust of readers took a long time 
and fake stories would have damaged the reputation of the outlet.  
 Because of the high costs for distribution, few players were present whose activity 
could be easily regulated.47 
From the beginning of the XXI century, technological advances allowed people to easily setup 
dynamic websites using publishing platforms like WordPress or Blogger, while social media 
gave users a wider audience to share information and content at virtually no cost. With the 
destruction of the entry barrier, reputation became an expendable asset, while the exponential 
increase of subjects made virtually impossible to control and regulate. Therefore, pages can be 
easily set up to spread disinformation on social platforms, bringing visibility and enormous 
revenues from ads. As the entry barrier is so low, even if the page is downgraded or banned, 
the publisher can simply create another one and start again. 48 
Disinformation should be considered a fully integrated cyber-warfare tool. There are 
organizations financed by commercial, political or government agencies that use highly 
advanced technological tools to influence public opinion with the specific purpose of sowing 
doubt. Troll-farms are established, organised and financed to attack prominent people, political 
parties or newspapers. Much of the content comes in the form of memes, which are images 
with writings that often escape controls,49 and is created and distributed in specific social 
communities, such as gamers, or far-right political activists, exploiting custom targeting that 
allowed the creation of dark ads,50 calibrated on people’s taste and political orientation. 
                                           
47 James Carson, What is fake news? Its origins and how it grew in 2016, The Telegraph, 17 June 2017. 
48 James Carson, What is fake... 
49 Paul Gil, What is a Meme?, Lifewire, 18 February 2019. 
50 Dark ads are a type of online advertising visible only to the advert's publisher and the intended target group. 
(Alex Hern, Facebook 'dark ads' can swing political opinions, The Guardian, 31 July 2017). 
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Content is then shared on other platforms, quite often being uncritically picked-up by journalists 
or politicians.51 
Fake or manipulated content is progressively shifting from social networks to chats (e.g. 
WhatsApp; Telegram; etc.), where it is very hard to control, with tragic consequences such as 
the explosions of violence in India or Pakistan.52  
The progressive increase in mistrust in institutions, not only political but also cultural ones, has 
led people to seek the comfort of their peers, ending up embracing alternative narratives of 
reality, often linked to conspiracy theories. Polarisation has dramatically increased in the last 
decades and social platforms have created a more homogeneous audience, which is less 
tolerant for alternative views, strengthening the attitude of accepting only ideologically 
compatible information.53 People prefer information consistent with their pre-existing beliefs 
(confirmation bias), and that pleases them (desirability bias). This undermine the effectiveness 
of fact-checking, as in many circumstances people tend to remember how they feel about 
information and not the context, thus confusing familiarity with reliability,54 in what has been 
defined by American comedian Stephen Colbert as “truthiness”, meaning “the belief in what you 
feel to be true rather than what the facts will support”.55   
Public figures and the media have a key role in disseminating false and unsupported 
information. In recent years there has been a dramatic increase in the number and type of 
news programs available, with a troubling amount of partisan programs that often feature 
false or exaggerated information. However, it needs to be said that scholars do not agree 
whether these programs increase misperception among an audience that already hold strongly 
established biases.56 Clearly, a misleading coverage of a crime contributes to a widespread 
misperception of crime rate in a specific area.57 
Although powerful in feeding people with what they want to read, it is still possible to 
encounter a wider variety of opinion online. The problem is how people get these opposing 
views: in the past they would have come from newspapers, in an individual experience. Online, 
everybody is constantly connected to their community, seeking the approval from like-minded 
peers. It's like constantly sitting with fellow fans in a football stadium, in what sociologists 
defined as strengthening the feelings of "in-group" belonging by increasing the distance with 
                                           
51 Camera dei Deputati, Audizione della Commissione per i diritti e i doveri relativi a Internet, 27 June 2017. 
52 For more info: Timothy McLaughlin, How WhatsApp Fuels Fake News and Violence in India, Wired, 12 December 
2018; Timothy McLaughlin, Disinformation is Spreading on WhatsApp in India and it's Getting Dangerous, Wired, 5 
September 2018. 
53 David M.J. Lazer, Matthew A. Baum, Yochai Benkler, The Science of Fake News, Science, vol. 359 issue 6380, 
March 2018. 
54 Briony Swire, Ullrich K H Ecker, Stephan Lewandowsky, The Role of Familiarity in Correcting Inaccurate 
Information, Journal of Experimental Psychology Learning Memory and Cognition, n. 43(12), June 2017. 
55 Travis Riddle, Scientists Dissect the Psychology of "Truthiness", Scientific American, Volume 307, Issue 4, 
October 2012. 
56 Matthew Levendusky, How Partisan Media Polarize America, University of Chicago Press, 2013. 
57 German Lopez, Americans don’t know crime has plummeted. In fact, they think it’s gone up, Vox, 10 October 
2016. 
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the "out-group", in a "us versus them" dynamic. This is the main reason that makes fact-
checking projects less effective, because belonging is stronger than facts.58 
 
2. Lessons from the Past (The Benefit of Hindsight) 
In his book “The Third Wave”, futurist Alvin Toffler described three types of societies that 
throughout human history pushed older society and culture aside. According to his 
classification, during the first wave Agriculture Society replaced the Hunter-Gatherer Society of 
the post-Neolithic. The second wave was the Industrial Age, "based on mass production, mass 
distribution, mass consumption, mass education, mass media, mass recreation, mass 
entertainment, and weapons of mass destruction." The Third Wave began in the 1950s and he 
described it as the Information Age. Each era was pushed by a revolution in information 
distribution. 59 
The dynamics of current “internet era” bear lots of similarities with the “printing press era”, 
because of the broad and profound effects they both have (and had) on society. 
Fifteen century Europe opened the door to the modern world. With its ferments, the deep 
tensions that animated the intellectual world as well as the religious and political world, the 
fundamental characteristics of the passing from one era to another were already present and 
progressively more and more defined. The two great powers of the feudal world, the Empire 
and the Papacy, in steady contrast with each other for absolute supremacy, saw their 
prerogatives fall and began descending into a completely irreversible crisis. The desire for 
greater autonomy of the monarchies in France, England and Spain, together with that of many 
European cities, where the emerging bourgeois class lived, hindered the exercise of imperial 
power. At the same time the Papacy, worn-out by the Avignon residency, was unable to 
contrast the propagation of religious schisms on the edge of heresy, which already foresee the 
Lutheran Reform.60  
From a socio-economic perspective, feudal barriers fell and trade routes opened up, a 
phenomenon that began in Italy with City-States and Maritime Republics,61 and quickly reached 
the rest of Europe. The growing commercial and manufacturing activities lessened the conflict 
between bourgeoisie and nobility, both involved with the same economic interests.62 The 
cultural needs of men no longer segregated in the medieval microcosm of the village, but 
thrown into the world in search of profits, were pushed by the reborn interest for ancient Greek 
                                           
58 Zeynep Tufekci, How social media took us from Tahrir Square to Donald Trump, Technology Review, 14 August 
2018. 
59 Alvin Toffler, The Third Wave, Bantam Books, 1981. 
60 Renata Ago, Vittorio Vidotto, Storia Moderna, Laterza, Bologna, 2008. 
61 Italian Maritime Republics were: Pisa; Amalfi; Genoa; Venice. (Marc'Antonio Bragadin, Storia delle Repubbliche 
marinare, Odoya, Bologna 2010) 
62 Niall Ferguson, The Ascent of Money: The Financial History of the World. Penguin, 2008 
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and Latin culture, as Humanism produced a new philosophical vision that trigger a rebellion to 
the rigid patterns of the feudal world.63  
 
2.1 Revolution in Dissemination 
According to Marshall McLuhan “the invention of movable type was the decisive moment in the 
change from a culture in which all the senses partook of a common interplay to a tyranny of 
the visual”. The typography contributed to the birth of modern man, allowing it to develop 
capacities hitherto dormant. 64  
The first prints attributable to Gutenberg are the "Letters of 
Indulgence" and the "Appeal against the Turks". The first 
consisted in a letter by which Pope Niccolò V granted 
indulgence to all those who had helped “by means and 
offers” to the fight against the Turks, who had conquered 
Constantinople in 1453 and brought down the Eastern 
Roman Empire. The second was probably printed by 
Gutenberg as a test. Both products show us how the new 
invention shifted book production towards new 
perspectives. The possibility of reproducing a large number 
of all identical copies of the same work immediately 
created a new market that was unthinkable before. 
Alongside the printing of books, the production of 
indulgences, calendars, and pamphlets on topics often 
ephemeral, the proto-typographers did not addressed only 
scholars, but laid the foundations of modern advertising 
related to the production of large quantities of publications.65  
The invention quickly spread first in Germany, then in the rest of Europe. Italy’s rich cities, 
cradles of Humanism and the Renaissance, were the first to host a large number of German 
printers. Books became immediately a commodity, something no more confined to 
monasteries, but objects that attracted the interest of a wider audience. The industrial process 
had brought the prices of books down so much that they were transformed into consumer 
goods, bought by the growing number of people belonging to the middle class who could read 
and write. In Venice, Aldo Manunzio became one of the first publishers, invented the cursive 
typeface, and contributed to the diffusion of a large amount of Greek and Latin classics.66  
                                           
63 Riccardo Fubini, L'umanesimo Italiano e i suoi storici: origini Rinascimentali, Critica Moderna, Milano, 
FrancoAngeli, 2001 
64 Marshall McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man, University of Toronto Press, 1962. 
65 Mario Ferrigni, Gutenberb, Hoepli, Milano, 1939. 
66 Neri Pozza, L’Editoria Veneziana. Da Giovanni da Spira ad Aldo Manunzio, Storia della Cultura Veneta. Dal Primo 
Quattrocento al Concilio di Trento, vol. 2, Vicenza, 1980. 
Figure 3 – Printing Workshop 
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In Strasbourg, Johan Mantelein, most probably a Gutenberg worker, understanding the 
commercial possibilities of people’s fascination for the new invention, turned his work to the 
service of the secular world. He made his debut with a very bad edited Bible, nevertheless 
revealing his business sense because he had succeeded in compressing the enormous bulk into 
just 850 pages. The second edition of the Bible presented another novelty: it was in German. 
This was followed by the publication of medieval poetry, books of legends, fairy tales, and 
leaflets. In Mainz, Johann Fust, one of the closest business partners of Gutenberg, was the first 
to bring the invention to Paris. During his presentation at the Sorbonne, he was ousted and 
accused of witchcraft, because “only the Devil could have dozens of copies of the same book”. 
Immediately afterwards, three German printers were invited to set up the first printing press at 
the university, and started printing in French. 67 
The invention of movable type lead to a noticeable leap in social evolution, which socio-
cultural-economic effects are not easy to quantify, as it spread so rapidly in such a short time 
in all Europe. It created the first industrial production process in the history of mankind, with a 
clear division of labour in precise phases, to produce large quantities of objects at the same 
time. By the end of the seventeenth century, the quantity of publishing products had assumed 
unimaginable dimensions for a man who lived only two centuries before.68  
Distribution and sales techniques were developed that allowed the widest and fastest diffusion 
of the new merchandise. Producing and distributing more books also meant spreading more 
and more information that reached even the most remote corners of Europe in a relatively 
short time. Renaissance men were overwhelmed by a multitude of publications of all kind, 
finally in a language they spoke and not in the obscure Latin of the Church or in the unknown 
Greek of scholars.69  
The need to sell an increasing amount of books to boost profits, lead also to the distribution of 
publications hitherto prohibited, with superstitions, manipulated content, or promoting 
paganism. A tragic example was the "Malleus Maleficarum", an anti-witchcraft manual that 
was widespread and used to justify atrocious violence and torture against women.70 
The fact that a message or an event could be communicated to thousands of people in a 
language understandable by everyone was a huge potential, immediately implemented by the 
ruling class. From the beginning of the sixteenth century the sovereigns of all Europe had begun 
to exploit the new invention to enhance their image. But it was Martin Luther who immediately 
recognised the power of the new invention to spread his reformist ideas, setting up a printing 
shop in Wittenberg.71 
                                           
67 Nicoletta Castagni, Gutenberg: la Mirabile Invenzione, Storia dei Mass Media: dalla Selce al Silicio, Gutenberg 
2000, Milano, 1984. 
68 Nicoletta Castagni, Gutenberg… 
69 Nicoletta Castagni, Gutenberg… 
70 Giordano Berti, Storia della Stregoneria. Origini, credenze, persecuzioni e rinascita nel mondo contemporaneo, 
Mondadori, Milano 2010. 
71 Claudio Pozzoli, Vita di Martin Lutero, Rusconi, Milano, 1983. 
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The success of the reform was also due to new production techniques, which required new 
products to be disseminated. Message and instrument thus formed a unity, in which the book 
went from being a precious treasure to that of being a commodity. The sacredness of the 
object then passed from the book to its contents. The concepts of “author” and “reader” were 
created, and the technological innovation was operating a profound mutation that definitively 
separated medieval and modern man.72  
 
3. Understanding Vulnerabilities 
The increased international complexity has made society particularly vulnerable to 
disinformation operations, not only as a result of the threats posed by hostile actors or 
psychometric profiling - which can be seen as both exploiters or facilitators - but due to the 
effect of three different factors:  
 Information overload;  
 The impact on public opinion of online platforms built for viral advertising and users’ 
engagement;  
 The complex iteration among fast technology development, globalization, and post-
colonialism, which have rapidly changed the international order. 
In 1983, computer science pioneer Luigi Dadda wrote: "It is happening. It is now under 
everyone's eyes. An evolution of our way of producing, of communicating, of living, so fast to 
be called a revolution, the post-industrial revolution. It is provoked by a complex mix of cultural, 
social, economic, scientific, and technological factors, among which the latter emerge as a 
driving force. All technology is involved, but one is imposed, that related to the generation, 
collection, transmission, elaboration, and dissemination of information".73 
Resilience to rapid technological changes were considered central by futurist Alvin Toffler, who 
argued that these changes have occurred so quickly that a large number of people were unable 
to adapt and experienced undue stress and confusion, introducing the term "future shock", 
based on the concept of "culture shock".74  
Human beings live in linear world, while technology grows at exponential rate. According to IBM 
Senior Vice President for Cognitive Solutions, John E. Kelly III: "The only time an exponential 
growth is experienced is when something is accelerating, like a car, or decelerating really 
suddenly with a hard braking. And when that happens, you feel uncertain and uncomfortable 
for a short period of time. The feeling being engendered now among a lot of people is that of 
always being in this state of acceleration.”75 
                                           
72 Giovanni Giovannini, Storia dei Mass Media: dalla Selce al Silicio, Gutenberg 2000, Milano, 1984. 
73 Luigi Dadda, Media Duemila, n.1, Torino, 1983. 
74 The term was first used in 1958 to describe the anxiety produced when a person moves to a completely new 
environment.  
75 Thomas L. Friedman, Thank You for Being Late, Penguin Books, New York, 2011. 
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Moreover, X Development76 CEO Eric “Astro” Teller, also tried to explain how technological 
advancements are challenging human ability to adapt: “Imagine two curves on a graph. One 
line represents scientific progress. At first it moves up very gradually, and then it starts to slope 
higher as innovations build on innovations that have come before, and then it starts to soar 
straight to the sky. A thousand years ago that curve rose so gradually that it could take one 
hundred years for the world to look and feel dramatically different”.77  
Teller argues that the slow technological development during the Middle-Ages did not produced 
visible social effects, but that changed dramatically in the XX Century, when the process of 
technological and scientific advance began to speed up, having effects on society: “At the 
beginning of the century it would have taken 20 or 30 years for technology to make the world 
uncomfortably different. Think about the introduction of the car or the airplane. Then the slope 
of the curve started to go almost straight up and off the graph with the convergence of mobile 
devices, broadband connectivity, and cloud computing. These developments diffused the tools 
of innovation to many more people on the planet, enabling them to drive change farther, faster, 
and more cheaply”.78  
“The second line”, argues Teller “is the 
rate at which humanity, individuals and 
society, adapts to changes in its 
environment. These can be 
technological, geophysical, and social 
changes. Humanity has got a little bit 
faster at adapting over the centuries, 
thanks to greater literacy and 
knowledge diffusion”.79   
The acceleration speed of innovation, 
much above the rate of absorption, is 
causing cultural angst as societal structures are in constant catch-up mode and cannot keep 
the pace with the rate of change. “If the technology platform for society can now turn over in 
five to seven years”, argues Teller, “but it takes ten to fifteen years to adapt to it, we will all 
feel out of control, because we cannot adapt to the world as fast as it is changing. By the time 
we get used to the change, that will not even be the prevailing change anymore”.80 
  
                                           
76 X Development LLC. (formerly Google X) is an American semi-secret research and development facility and 
organization founded by Google in January 2010, which now operates as a subsidiary of Alphabet Inc. 
77 Thomas L. Friedman, Thank you for... 
78 Thomas L. Friedman, Thank you for... 
79 Thomas L. Friedman, Thank you for... 
80 Thomas L. Friedman, Thank you for… 
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3.1 Overload of Information 
 
"I fear that we will remain in our current confusion and indigence for our own 
fault. I am afraid even that after uselessly exhausted our curiosity without 
obtaining any gain from our research any weight for our happiness, people 
get tired of science and, driven by a fatalistic discomfort, replaced by 
barbaric costumes, and perhaps this result will contribute a lot of that 
horrible mass of books that grows incessantly. Then, in the end, such 
disorder can no longer be sheltered: the indefinite multitude of writers will 
soon condemn them to the danger of a general oblivion, the hope of glory 
that animates many and pushes them to study, will suddenly cease, perhaps 
it will become in the future as blameworthy to write a book as soon as it 
was praiseworthy”. (Gottfried Leibnitz, 1680) 
 
The information explosion that caused so much concern in Leibnitz accelerated in the last 
decades following the development of democracy, information pluralism, decentralization of 
powers, and decolonization of countries that claimed their place in the international scenario, 
quickly becoming producers and consumers of information. At the increased public participation 
to social life,  coincided an increased demand for information, causing a progressive saturation 
which inevitably turned what took the name of “information society” into a society of 
disinformation, ignorance and incompetence.81  
Dealing with overload of information is a concern that troubled philosophers and intellectuals 
since the invention of the movable type. Descartes biographer, Adrien Baillet, complaining 
about the growing production of information, wrote something that now sounds like a 
premonition: “We have reason to fear that the multitude of books which grows every day in a 
prodigious fashion will make the following centuries fall into a state as barbarous as that of 
the centuries that followed the fall of the Roman Empire. Unless we try to prevent this danger 
by separating those books which we must throw out or leave in oblivion from those which one 
should save and within the latter between what is useful and what is not”.82  
The chaos produced by the overload of information has been amplified by three main drivers:  
 Manipulation of sources. 
 Insufficient mediation between the source of the message and the recipient. 
 Difficulty for the user to manage the mass of information available. 
 
Our knowledge structure is influenced not only by contents, but also by the techniques used to 
process information, which are not neutral and their consequences do not depend solely on who 
employs them, but on what they mediate and why. Marshall McLuhan wrote "The effects of 
                                           
81 Sergio Lepri, Medium e Messaggio. Il Trattamento Linguistico e Concettuale dell'Informazione, Gutenberg, 1986. 
82 Adrien Baillet, Jugemens des sçavans sur les principaux ouvrages des auteurs, Paris, 1685. 
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technology do not occur at the level of opinions or concepts, but alter sense ratios or patterns 
of perception steadily and without any resistance", consequently "the medium is the message" 
or rather the medium is also the message.83  
In the era of Internet, with the progressive disappearance of vertical media in an increasingly 
“liquid society”, some experts, like sociologist Derrick De Kerkchove, updated the famous 
sentence to a more modern “the network is the message”, with the network intended in a 
technical form, as production and consumption of content and as a form of structuring social 
ties.84 Tom Goodwin instead flips it into “the message is the medium”, arguing that in the new 
hyper-connected media ecosystem, there will be no more dedicated channels and devices, but 
only different levels of content.85 
Italian philosopher and writer Umberto Eco once compared the condition of people exposed to 
a massive overload of information to Borges’ character Funes “el memorioso”, who was 
incredibly capable of retaining any kind of information he could reach, but was unable to 
process any.86 
New technologies have disrupted traditional gatekeepers, like governments or media, control 
over information flows. Online platforms have broken down what social scientists call 
"pluralistic ignorance", meaning the belief that everyone is alone with its own views in a reality 
where everyone has been collectively silenced.  
In the beginning social media fomented so much rebellion, because people realized to be no 
more isolated and drew strength from one another. It was a central tool during the so-called 
Arab spring that toppled down many longstanding autocrats.87 In Egypt, during the Tahrir 
uprising, President Mubarak attempted to suffocate protests by cutting off internet cellular 
service. He did not understand that in an era where information is abundant, attention is what 
matters. Cairo revolutionaries quickly found other ways to send out information through 
satellite phones, allowing them to continue giving interviews and sending data to an 
increasingly interested global audience. Within few weeks, Mubarak was forced out. 88 
In less than ten years, digital technologies have gone from being regarded as a beacon for 
freedom and change to become a threat to democracy, enabling increasing polarization, rising 
authoritarianism, and meddling with national elections.  Arab spring and Barack Obama election 
were hailed as the dawn of a new era, where big data, Smartphones, and the rapid spread of 
information would have represented a "deadly combination for dictators". It also fed the illusion 
                                           
83 Marshall Mcluhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man, New York, McGraw Hill, 1964. 
84 Ignazia Bartholini, Capitale Sociale, Reti Comunicative e Culture di Ppartecipazione, Franco Angeli, Milano, 2008. 
85 Tom Goodwin, In the new age of ubiquitous connectivity the message is the medium, TechCrunch, 4 March 
2017. 
86 Umberto Eco wrote: "Jorge Luis Borges once wrote a beautiful novel, entitled Funes el memorioso, about a 
character that remembers everything, every leaf he saw on every tree, every word he heard in his life, every gust 
of wind he felt, every taste that he has tasted, and every letter he has read. Yet Funes is a complete idiot, a man 
blocked by his inability to select and throw away. Our unconscious works because it throws away. The World Wide 
Web is Funes El Memorioso”. (Umberto Eco, Cronache di una Societa Liquida, La nave di Teseo, 2016.) 
87 Mohammed Noureddine Affaya, The Arab Spring: Breaking the chains of authoritarianism and postponed 
democracy, Contemporary Arab Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 4, 2011. 
88 Zeynep Tufekci, How Social Media… 
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that democracies would have had always the upper hand, and led to the exploitation of digital 
vulnerabilities (e.g. bugs, secret backdoors, exploits, etc.) following a concept named "nobody 
but us" (NOBUS for the intelligence community), meaning that nobody could have used these 
vulnerabilities, so there was no need to patch them or strengthening cyber-security. 89 
The mistaken interpretation of digital security facilitated Russian interference with 2016 USA 
Presidential elections, where the hacking and release of DNC Committee emails, subverted the 
debate by flooding the public with distorted or irrelevant information.90  
The insufficient mediation between the source and the message has led many people assume 
to be knowledgeable, entitled to their own opinions,91 supported by Google or Wikipedia, and by 
the ease with which they can express them on social networks. There is so much information 
around that people believe can absorb it only by immersion.92 People with little knowledge are 
afraid of educated people and develop hostility to knowledge.93 These dynamics has created a 
conflict between the people who fabricated the most convenient truth and the experts, who 
have to deal with a framework of shared truth. Incredibly, even mass education has its 
responsibilities: there are people convinced that their cultural background is sufficient to 
challenge the consent of experts, for example in the medical field.94 
Umberto Eco once stated in an interview: “The abundance of information is certainly the engine 
for democratic development, but it is not so always true. This abundance, in fact, is a very 
democratic factor when it comes to a dictatorship, but it can have dictatorial implications when 
it is present in a democratic system. As the totality of contents are available in a disordered, 
unfiltered and unorganised manner, the Internet allows everyone to build their own 
encyclopaedia, meant as a system through which a culture filters, preserves and eliminates 
information. In theory, we can get six billion different encyclopaedias: is this a democratic 
acquisition? I do not think so, because the function of an encyclopaedia is precisely that of 
establishing what should be preserved and what should be thrown away. In asserting that 
Ptolemy was wrong and Galileo right, the encyclopaedia excludes those crazy writers who still 
today write volumes to show that the earth is flat. By filtering these positions, the 
encyclopaedia creates a platform of common language and only on the basis of this platform 
one can challenge the prevailing theories”.95 
Digital technologies have on one hand weakened old-style information gatekeepers, 
empowering decentralized actors; but on the other hand have given the power to authoritarians 
                                           
89 Zeynep Tufekci, How Social Media… 
90 Ellen Nakashima, Shane Harris, How the Russians hacked the DNC and passed its emails to WikiLeaks, The 
Washington Post, 13 July 2018. 
91 Jamie Whyte, The Right to Your Opinion. Crimes Against Logic, McGraw-Hill, New York, 2004; Patrick Stokes, 
You're not entitled to your opinion, NZ Herald, 9 October 2012. 
92 Daniel M. Wegner, Adrian F. Ward, The Internet Has Become the External Hard Drive for Our Memories, Scientific 
American, Volume 309, Issue 6, 2013. 
93 Crystal C. Hall, Lynn Ariss, Alexander Todorov, The illusion of knowledge: When more information reduces 
accuracy and increases confidence, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, n. 103, 2007. 
94 Matthew Fisher, Mariel K. Goddu, Frank C. Keil, Searching for Explanations: How the Internet Inflates Estimates 
of Internal Knowledge, Journal of Experimental Psychology, Vol. 144, No. 3, 2015. 
95 Umberto Eco, La cultura è anche capacità di filtrare le informazioni, Athenet. La rivista dell'Università di Pisa, 
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and extremists to weaken trust in institutions making everyone too fractured and paralysed to 
act by "mudding the waters" and creating a cyberspace too noisy and confusing where any 
reasonable and constructive proposal has no chance to make an impact.  
The loss of information gatekeepers has not only opened up more space for truth and dissent, 
but also has destroyed the barrier that blocked misinformation and disinformation. 
Globalisation has conveyed more interest towards local communities and local information, in a 
time where local news outlets were experiencing a troubled transition to digitalization.96 That 
has opened fertile ground for misinformation and disinformation operations. Russia, for 
example, has taken advantage of the situation creating hundreds of fake local media brands in 
the US or sharing fake local information in many European countries.97 
 
3.2 Globalization and Identity Crisis 
Technology has been the driving force of any globalization wave in history, but it sped up its 
pace from the XIX century, when four industrial revolutions have taken place: in the first, steam 
power mechanized production; in the second electric power was used to create mass 
production; the third used electronics and information technology to automate production. The 
fourth is characterized by a fusion of technologies that is blurring the lines between the 
physical, digital, and biological spheres.98  
The speed of technology advancements has sped up globalization and completely reshaped 
the world, making it operate differently. This has happened so fast that institutions or society 
were not able to keep up. After decades of globalisation, the distribution of planetary wealth 
has successfully grown beyond the authority of national governments. 99 
The nation-state system seems no more able to withstand the countervailing forces of the XXI 
century, being incapable to exert influence over human circumstance. The political structures 
built in the XX century are literally drowning in an ocean of deregulated finance, autonomous 
technology, religious militancy and great-power rivalry.100  
The international order as-we-know-it became universal after the First World War, when the 
new principle of "national self-determination" prevailed over others, in that first experiment of 
international regulatory organization known as "Société des Nations". The nation-state system 
is under distress as a result of the demolition of the old idea of the international society, with a 
rising concern, by an increasing number of people, that the system is unable to offer a 
plausible, viable future. The structure of post-war state possessed a unique level of control 
over domestic economy, as capital could not move unchecked across borders and foreign 
                                           
96 Alberto Alesina, Enrico Spolaore, The Size of Nations, MIT Press, 2003. 
97 Zeynep Tufekci, How social media… 
98 Klaus Schwab, The Fourth Industrial Revolution: what it means, how to respond, Global Agenda, World Economic 
Forum, 14 January 2016. 
99 Dov Seidman, The Moral Imperative of Modern Leadership, Fortune-Time Global Forum, 2 December 2016. 
100 Rana Dasgupta, The demise of the Nation State, The Guardian, 5 April 2018. 
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currency speculation was negligible compared to today. This allowed governments to channel 
revenues from taxation into national development.101 
The idea of nation-state is relatively recent. Its widespread adoption can be traced back to mid 
XIX century. At that time, liberal theorists viewed the establishment of nation-states as the best 
solution to keep together a heterogeneous society composed of different races, cultures and 
ideologies. At the end of the century, as major ethnic conflicts began to arise, the need for 
larger markets to absorb the newly developed mass production required enlarged countries. 
Patriotism was used then to unify citizens against outsiders, while colonialism was used to 
secure resource and provide breathing space to economies.102  
Two major developments after the Second World War were the decolonization in Asia and 
Africa; and the dramatic increase in openness of international trade. Scholars believe that if 
states had retrenched themselves into protectionism as they did in the aftermath of the First 
World War, decolonization would probably have not occurred, as well as it would have been 
more difficult for former countries under Soviet control to break away in the 80s and ending up 
isolated in a protectionist world.103  
The strong will of eastern European countries to enter the European Union adds credence to 
this idea, where the trade flows have dramatically increased on the way to the enlargement 
and would had been harder in a world with higher barriers. In fact, while economic integration 
has progressed, regional identity became more and more vocal during the decades.104 
Canadian economist Michael Bordo has argued that “Globalization, in the sense of increased 
integration of international markets, has waxed and waned throughout history. Most recently, it 
thrived between the middle of the nineteenth century and World War I, languished and 
retreated until about 1970, and has thrived again since then”.105  
Scholars describe the period between mid-1800 and the First World War as one of the most 
significative globalization period in history, because of the wide overall market integration, the 
rise in voluntary migration numbers, and the size of capital investments.106 The process of 
international integration began with the opening up of the world in the Age of Discovery in the 
sixteenth century, but the major spurt in globalization happened between 1815 and 1914, 
where trade grew by 3.5% each year, income grew 2.7%, while mass migration, no more 
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composed by slaves or free settlers, grew from 300.000 per year between 1850 to 1880, to 
over one million between 1900 and 1910.107  
By the end of the XIX century, European nations have established some uniform attributes, like 
fiercely enforced state monopolies in areas such as defence, taxation, and law, which gave 
governments a complete control over national activities. This was possible because the Treaty 
of Westphalia108 recognised the existing states making large-scale conquest difficult on the 
continent, but allowing the expansion into the rest of the world, thanks to technological 
innovations.  
The process of nation-state building was part of a profound theological reorganization started 
with the Enlightenment and carried all over Europe by Napoleon army. The French Revolution, 
and before that the American Revolution, not only dethroned absolute monarchies, but also 
removed God as the immobile engine, absorbing its superlative attributes (omniscience and 
omnipotence) into the newly born state institutions, which became the foundation of the 
secular faith dedicated to develop, liberate and redeem mankind.109  
The spiritual and material development of citizen and nations hold its foundation on a moral 
promise that was expressed through spectacular state-run projects in the fields of education, 
healthcare and culture. During the decolonization that followed WW2, the European nation-
state structure was exported everywhere, pushed by unprecedented decades of growth. 
Current globalization wave has enabled unprecedented level of prosperity, rising hundreds of 
millions from poverty, but it rests on shaky pillars, as global markets are prone to instability, 
inefficiency and weak popular legitimacy. The Bretton Woods agreement allowed policy makers 
to focus on reconstruction and prosperity in a multilateral regime, permitting the countries that 
conquered independence to experience unprecedented levels of economic growth.  
The continuous falling costs of transportation that followed the exploration era, with the 
invention of the steam engine, then the propulsion technology and the introduction of the Jet 
Aircraft in the 1950s, improved physical communication and technological advances in the 
realm of telecommunication, computing, satellites which has resulted in a more quick and 
efficient flow of information, contributing to a massive economic expansion and the so-called 
"global shrinkage" in terms of distances.110 
Eventually, the Bretton Woods system eventually became unsustainable and came to an end, 
being superseded by a more ambitious agenda of economic liberalization and deep integration. 
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Instead of helping countries to recover from the economic shocks of the 70s, financial 
globalization fostered instability and generated inequality and insecurity.111  
In recent years the number of citizens saying globalisation has been good for their country has 
fallen precipitously. Prominent economists have spoken not against it, but in favour of creating 
new institutions and compensation mechanism, instead of relying on those created in 1944 for 
the Bretton Woods regime, to render globalization more fair, effective and sustainable.112 
Information technologies have been regarded as potentially capable of building bridges and 
unite communities of people geographically separated. Paradoxically, they have also the power 
to fragment interaction and divide groups, making easier for people to screen out unwanted 
contact of information. The result is that geographic boundaries have been supplanted by 
digital boundaries that then are reflected into society.113  
The effect is not merely a tendency for members to conform to the group average but a 
radicalization in which this average move toward extremes. Meanwhile the suppressed 
consequences of XX century world are erupting, cracking nations into fragments and forcing 
populations into post-national solidarities: roving tribal militias, ethnic and religious sub-states 
and super-states. The result is white supremacists and radical Islamists alike take up arms 
against contamination and corruption.114  
This marks the limits of the national imagination and generates the dynamic of Disinformation.  
Nation-state narrative guarantees that if citizens recognise the chain of authority, everything 
will be all right, while disinformation destabilizes, disintegrates and disorients identity. It 
displaces aspirations with anger born of confusion and despair, destroying social cohesion.115 
The new technological gatekeepers of social reality established a de-terrorialised form of 
citizenship, which is slowly replacing fundamental functions of the nation-state. Governments 
are perceived as controlled by outside forces with only a partial influence over national affairs, 
echoing the condition of world's poorest countries. This feeling of primitive vulnerability is 
terrifying the west, leaving populations shattered and bereft. As the idea of western nation as a 
universal home collapses, transnational tribal identities grow up as refuge.116 
The rising of a new brand of apocalyptic nationalism, fascination for wall-building strongmen, 
xenophobia, irrational outbreaks of rage (especially against immigrants, the appointed 
scapegoats), and fanatical promises of restoration of a mythical nation golden age, are not the 
cures, but possible symptoms of a slow political and moral decay of nation-state concept,117 
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which has lost the power to engage its citizens into a national narrative, because such narrative 
has lost its coherence.118  
The national narrative that allowed the integration of the masses into society has not been 
replaced by a new one that provides the demand for a protective enclosure to citizens who feel 
no longer incorporated into the political realm of a globalized and uncivil society.119 
The libertarian dream of an international order managed by nation-states, is slowly succumbing 
to pristine hi-tech corporate systems, which have already assumed many functions previously 
associated with the state, and represent a vision for the future.120 
 
3.2.1 The Rise of Populism 
The world economy is more globalised today than at any time in history, and that caused a 
political backlash. This is similar to what followed the previous wave of globalization, pushed 
by technological advances and trade liberalisation, at the end of the XIX century. At that time, 
with agricultural prices plummeting, countries raised protectionist trade barriers that soon 
spread to manufacturing. Mass migration brought a large number of people from Europe to 
South America and the US, the greatest receiver, which soon began to restrict immigration from 
an increasing number of countries.121  
Of great interest from current perspective is the backlash against the Gold Standard.122 Being a 
financial globalization anchor, it was seen as to produce tight credit conditions and a 
deflationary effect on agricultural prices. Grievances from farmers created the first populist 
movement in the US, which put together farmers and miners against bankers, whom were 
viewed as beneficiaries of the Gold Standard. The populists were eventually defeated, but the 
contrast between cosmopolitan financial interests and nationalist groups moved to Europe, 
where it intensified in the interwar period. 123 
In recent times, populism has taken a different political approach, not only targeting free trade, 
but directly EU institutions, perceived as intrusive in domestic policy and regulations. In fact, 
even Brexit advocates presented free trade as one of the advantages of leaving the EU.124 
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Globalisation has created great opportunities, helped the rapid transformation of poor 
countries, spurring growth and reducing poverty. However, it created domestic dualism that 
increased inequality, mostly between skilled vs unskilled workers, globally mobile professionals 
vs local producers, cities vs countryside, cosmopolitan vs communitarian, elites vs ordinary 
people. Naturally automation and digital technologies played a much greater role in 
accelerating de-industrialisation, but globalisation has been accused of having created an 
unfair system where only financiers and large corporation were taking advantage. As a 
consequence, the rise of populist parties has to be linked to anti-globalization sentiments, but 
those are not linked in principle with trade shocks, but with an emphasis on cultural, national, 
ethnic and religious identity of people against outside groups. So, if in the US Mexicans, Chinese 
and Muslims are attacked, in Europe are immigrants, in particular from Africa or Muslim 
countries, to be paired with “EU bureaucrats” to be identified as the external enemy.125  
Fears generated with economic anxiety, discontent and loss of legitimacy rarely come with 
policy perspectives, but are used for political mobilisation with arguments meant to resonate 
with their base. It is easier to mobilize people along the ethno-cultural line, when economic 
anxieties can be channelled against immigrants and refugees, presented as posing an unfair 
competition for jobs, and eroding welfare state benefits, reducing resources available for 
natives.126  
Political scientist Francis Fukuyama believes that globalization, the internet, automation, mass 
migration, the financial crisis, and the rapid changes in the international order have left people 
with a deep sense of being dismissed, where identity politics have become a "cheap substitute 
for serious thinking about how to reverse the 30-year trend in most liberal democracies toward 
greater socio-economic inequality”.127  
Among the causes for political polarisation, should be considered the effect of the end of the 
cold war, which dissolved the one global enemy, ending the cohesion created by the external 
threat. An identitarian self-perception has instead rose, shifting the focus from unifying values 
to group identities.128 
In this scenario, the left has concentrated on “promoting the interests of a wide variety of 
groups perceived as being marginalised,” whereas the right “has redefined itself as patriots who 
seek to protect traditional national identity, an identity that is often explicitly connected to race, 
ethnicity or religion”.129     
In a globalised society where citizens are no more incorporated in political realm through trade 
unions, parties, and churches, the "national narratives" that allowed the masses to integrate 
into industrial society have not been replaced by anything stronger enough to rival against the 
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populist ethno-nationalism. The strong demand for protective enclosure has created a path 
towards social authoritarianism and a ferocious critique of cultural liberalism.   
The decline of support for traditional parties should be linked on the left, to trade unions 
reduced capacity to mobilise workers as an effect of de-industrialization; on the right to the 
growth of secularism that made Christian religious identity more private. These elements, 
combined with quick economic and social changes, created a fertile ground for populist parties 
able to attract alienated voters, who believe that their national identity is under threat from 
foreign cultures, distrust of elites, and a sense of exclusive nationalism.130 
Left-wing parties have tried ever since to stop the decline in support by gradually abandoning 
the multicultural celebration of difference in favour of reduced immigration policies.131 Right-
wing mainstream parties have also seen their consensus being drained by populists, when they 
abandoned their advocacy for free market for a nativist protection of welfare state, reserved 
only for the "deserving", thus excluding immigrants and Muslims.132  
The hostility to Islam has been hidden behind ethno-cultural concerns, arguing that only a hard 
anti-Islamic stance could protect European traditional values from Muslim intolerance against 
homosexuality, Jews, secularists and women.133 A series of crimes, like the murder of Dutch 
filmmaker Theo van Gogh in 2004, the death threats against Danish cartoonists who published 
a series of cartoons featuring the prophet Muhammad in 2005, the terroristic attack against 
the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo and at the Bataclan theatre in 2015, helped keep 
Islam in the spotlight and was heavily exploited by populist parties.134   
Contrary to common belief, Europe has not experience a rising of populist parties in the last 
decades, but their success it is a pretty recent event. The definition itself is uncertain, as it 
fluctuated over the political spectrum since the XIX century. At that time, the political far-right 
lambasted industrial society, which had replaced traditional rural society. In the interwar period, 
urbanization was accused of being the cause of decadence and up-rootedness, against the 
purity of peasantry. In the post-industrial era, protest against globalization has replaced that 
against urbanisation.135 
Populism made its first appearance in a European election in the 1970s as an expression of 
opposition to welfare state, with the unexpected success of the Danish Fremskridtspartiet, 
which became the second largest political party in 1973, before collapsing. From then on, 
populists have considered political change as decadence from which only the "common people" 
can restore the nation grandeur and cast aside the "corrupted elites".  
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Dutch political scientist Cas Mudde defined populism as "an ideology that considers society to 
be separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups - the pure people - versus - the 
corrupt elite - and which argues that politics should be an expression of the general will of the 
people".136 
During the decades, the opposition shifted from being against welfare to a critique of 
multiculturalism, seen as a menace to identity purity. When the French Front National was 
established in the early 1970s, its aim was to block the alliance of Socialist and Communist 
that allegedly would have brought the country under Soviet influence, but no mention was 
made about immigration, or about Islam.137 
The first to raise the Identitarian issue was the British Conservative party in 1968 by what it 
became known as the Rivers of Blood speech by Enoch Powell, who claimed that "Great Britain 
would face civil war if it did not manage to control the flow of non-white immigration", stating 
the ethno-cultural incompatibility of migrants and the necessity of an immediate 
repatriation.138 In the same period, under the slogan "Keep Britain White", Colin Jordan 
fabricated the immigrationist conspiracy of the genocide of the white race, in an attempt to 
force moderate parties to compete with the far-right on the theme, presenting themselves as a 
movement defending common people and traditional values.139 In the same period, Danish and 
Norwegian populist parties moved from an anti-elitist protest to ethnic-nativism. 
Two main events shaped the international scenario and resulted in boosting populist parties to 
a larger audience: the terroristic attack to the Twin Towers in 2001, and the recession that 
followed the 2008 financial crisis.  
In the Netherlands, Pim Fortuyne co-opted the debate on integration of immigrants, affirming 
that Muslim immigration was a menace to the social consensus between Christian religious 
groups and secularists.140 Some years after, Geert Wilders organised his political message on 
rejecting elected officials to protect moral values, national security, against dual nationality, 
and with a sheer anti-Muslimism, anti-immigrant policy, on the basis of a supposed contract 
between the common people and the elites. This was echoed by French "Front National", which 
claimed to represent "the France of the forgotten" or "the France of the invisible that cannot 
speak".141  
The root causes of the growing of these movements lay no more on tax-revolt, which could 
even entail an inter-European antagonism (Luxembourg vs French workers; Swiss vs Italian 
workers), but on hedonist national security identity, that moved towards identity politics.  
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Through a mythicized representation of the working class and the industrial era, populist 
movements are critical of the moral decay of the postmodern individualism and the rapid 
transformation of society brought by globalisation, seeing it as a consequence of "islamisation" 
or "Zionism", ironically creating a postmodern behaviour though movements that are openly 
against modernity.142  
In societies where the educational level has risen considerably within a few decades, the 
increased demand for participation in the political process arrives at the very moment when the 
European space has reached a post democratic phase. Populist success does not merely 
indicate the crisis of multicultural society, but rather the desire of belonging to a "community" 
that stands together, where the notions of equality or freedom are not mobilised. This cannot 
be swept aside in the name of an "open society" or adaptation to a globalized society, and even 
less condemn it as a "fascist threat to democracy".  
Populists bring their electorate into politics that are interclassist, where anti-immigration 
policies are provided in exchange of their social demand, producing a new bloc of ethno-
liberalism. They have exploited the falsehood spread by mainstream parties and journalists 
that their rise was mainly about disparity of wealth and power, to play the role of the underdog 
challenging the established elites, thus avoiding being confronted on the ethno-cultural agenda 
and its subsequent accusation of racism.143 
Immigration has played a key role, as it did not clearly divide among the left-right line, rather 
separating globalists, culturally cosmopolitan and supportive of free movement, from 
nationalists, who instead are more concerned about cultural boundaries and traditional nation-
state characteristics.144 The latter remains a crucial part also of left-wing coalitions. Over the 
last decades, leftist parties have slowly moved away from economic inequality to cultural 
issues, in the effort to attract those university-educated, cosmopolitan liberals dubbed 
"anywheres" by British writer David Goodhart, opening up a space for populists' right to appeal 
to the working class on ethno-cultural grounds.145 
In recent years, anti-establishment parties have established themselves as defenders of the 
nation against the threats posed by foreigners and corrupt elites. Brexit, the election of Donald 
Trump and 2018 Italian General Election were a manifestation of this larger trend.  
The fear among white voters that their culture and identities were under threat is the main 
engine that moves populist parties. The migrant crisis and the wave of refugees coming from a 
war-torn Syria represented a boost for right-wing populists.  
In 2016, Ukip leader Nigel Farage, threatened Britons with a mass Muslim invasion if the 
country would have not left the EU, while Trump adopted, after several attempts, a ban for 
people coming from Muslim countries, as promised during the campaign.  
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Populism derive its strength from ethno-cultural anxiety, as a growing number of people in the 
west fear an erosion of the connection between their community and the shared ancestry of 
their homelands. The widespread conviction that populist voters are those left behind by 
globalisation is a comforting illusion for mainstream parties, although anti-establishment 
parties are gaining popularity also in country less affected by the economic crisis, 
demonstrating that traditional economic policies such as redistribution and job growth have 
proven not sufficient to stop populist growth.146   
The current process of radicalisation of intergroup conflict is highlighted by the increasing 
amount of population that vote in accordance with their identity motivation. The peculiarity of 
this process is that identity motivation is less and less positive and more and more oppositional 
and negative.147  
The strengthening of these "niches of belongingness" can be seen as an act of searching for 
identity cohesion aimed at fulfilling the basic need of making more representable and 
understandable an increasingly chaotic world. From this perspective, Brexit can be recognised 
as a semiotic solution to the identity crisis, a way of restoring sense of meaningfulness, even if 
the solution is worse than the problem it addresses. European Union countries are experiencing 
a deep socio-political turbulence that has fragmented social cohesion, decreased solidarity and 
partnership among European countries, fuelled ideological and religious radicalisation, and 
enhanced the rise of ultra-right parties in parallel with the growing political paralysis of 
European governance.148  
The dramatic radicalisation of intergroup conflicts has increased people feeling that their 
community is threatened by an external enemy, whose nature may vary, being the political 
elites, migrants, other European countries, welfare free riders, Muslim communities, etc. The 
constant feeling of being "under attack from a threatening other" generated a socio-political 
dynamic that concerned people system of values and worldviews, which quickly shifted 
towards intolerance and radicalization. This phenomenon can be seen as a consequence of 
decades of globalization, however their effects have spread at an astonishingly speed, bringing 
a widespread instability over Europe.149  
Twenty years ago, the very idea of quitting the EU or electing for higher offices leaders who 
were openly xenophobic or Nazi-apologist was unthinkable. For this reason, an increasing 
number of scholars are drawing parallels between the current socio-political situation and the 
dynamics happening in the period before the Second World War.150 
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The leaders of the new authoritarian populisms are aware that they cannot really control the 
national economies, now hostage to foreign investors, global agreements, and international 
finance. Everyone promises a national cultural purification as a way to world political power.  
The feeling of having enough of democracy today has a logic and a particular context in many 
ways. The spread of the internet and social media in increasingly more ample segments of the 
population, combined with the possibility of mobilisation, propaganda, identity building and 
search for similar ones formed by the network, has generated the dangerous illusion that it is 
possible to find peers, allies, friends, collaborators, converts and colleagues regardless of who 
we are and what we want. Every single nation-state has lost ground in the battle for the 
defence of minimal economic sovereignty.  
The spread of human rights has guaranteed a minimum recognition to the requests of 
strangers, foreigners and migrants in practically every country in the world, even in the face of 
hostile welcome and harsh conditions of permanence. These aspects have sharpened the 
general intolerance for the regular processes, the deliberative rationality and the patience 
required by democratic systems. Brexit is just the latest version of a long and constant debate 
on identity. Resentment towards migration management is exacerbated by the feeling that EU 
membership entails a drastic loss of well-being. These are desperate attempts to regain some 
economic sovereignty.  
The debate on migrants is an excellent example of how questions of economic sovereignty are 
translated into questions of cultural sovereignty. These translation and transposition operations 
are at the root of the development of right-wing populisms in the world.151 
The identity crisis has been caused by the fear of losing the collective existence, whereas it is 
whiteness, Christianity or the idyllic idea of rural country, which provided the ethnic character of 
the nation with its language, myths, and tradition. The fast changes in society, combined with 
the shrinking demographic weight of west's ethnic majorities, have created the idea that such 
identity was linked to the nation, but with a particular ethnic group. The solution is neither to 
dismiss these concerns nor to promise a time travel toward idealised and more homogenous 
times, but to reassure ethnic majorities that their identity will persist even in a fast-changing 
society.152 
According to a recent study, the paradoxical effect of this spread of democracy in the non-
Western world is that citizens, in many apparently solid democracies have not only become 
more critical towards their political leaders, but also more cynical than the value of democracy 
as a political system, less confident in the fact that their actions can influence public policies 
and more eager to express their consent to authoritarian alternatives.153 
What we see today in the West is not a temporary setback in a progressive development and 
not even a form of fear, but an inversion of tendency. The most dramatic feature is not the 
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appearance of authoritarian regimes, but the fact that many of the democratic ones are 
changing nature. Populism is not the product of a romantic nationalism, as it could be a century 
ago. On the contrary, it is fuelled not only by the upheavals caused by the technological 
revolution, but also by the demographic projections that foreshadow both a reduction in the 
weight of their countries and movements towards their countries. Demography pushes 
Europeans to imagine a world in which their culture is disappearing, while the technological 
revolution opens up a world in which their works will disappear.154  
The transformation of public opinion from revolutionary force to reactionary force explains the 
rise of right-wing populist parties. The current political disorder in Europe cannot be reduced to 
a revolt of the economic victims of globalization. The most solid argument in support of the 
view that it does not depend entirely on the economy is Poland: for a decade the Poles have 
enjoyed impressive economic growth, prosperity and even less social inequality. However, in 
2015 they voted for a reactionary. Globalisation has turned the world into a village, but this 
village lives on global comparisons, where people do not compare their lives with their 
neighbours, but with that of the richest inhabitants on the planet. Democracy is a mechanism 
of inclusion but also of exclusion. What we are witnessing is the emergence of majority regimes 
in which the majority transforms the state into a private possession as a response to the 
competitive pressure of the globalised world. The paradox of liberal democracy is that it has 
made citizens feel freer but less powerful.155  
Populists' fascination is directly connected with their unambiguous promise of victory, where 
the separation of powers is no longer perceived as democratic control, but as an alibi by which 
the elites can break electoral promises. The conviction of speaking for the majority makes it 
difficult for them to accept electoral defeat.156 
Nationalist’s movements are not only voted by the poor, but also by those who fall back into 
the lower middle class. These people did not become poor, but they were made unsafe. They 
fear decline, claim a status that they have lost, as workers and as supporters of the family. 
They are unhappy with the way the world has developed.157 
The loss of power of the old establishments towards emerging groups of outsiders arouses an 
exasperated resistance, a very unrealistic desire to restore the old order, not only for economic 
reasons but also because such groups feel humiliated in their consideration of themselves.158 
Middle-aged people with average qualifications and income seem to be particularly sensitive. 
Even if the studies are still in its infancy, these people are searching for hate messages online, 
sharing them as they feel disliked and exploited (by elites, by globalization, by women, by 
immigrants). They have the impression of being marginalized, of belonging to a minority in their 
own country to which no one listens. The fear of losing one's material and cultural status thus 
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becomes the engine of resentment, of negative instincts, of identity closures and of conspiracy 
theories.159 
Populist message is strong because it is inclusive, simple and comprehensible, offering 
solutions to fears that it helped generate. Identitarian narrative is built through contrast, going 
against everything that can put in discussion its very existence, from multiculturalism, 
globalization, to freedom of the press.  
 
3.3 How Algorithms are Shaping the Information Environment 
 
"Platforms and algorithms that promised to improve our lives can actually 
magnify our worst human tendencies. Rogue actors and even governments 
have taken advantage of user trust to deepen divisions, incite violence and 
even undermine our shared sense of what is true and what is false. [..]Our own 
information, from the everyday to the deeply personal, is being weaponised 
against us with military efficiency. [..] (Algorithms) serve up increasingly 
extreme content, pounding our harmless preferences into hardened 
convictions". (Tim Cook, 2018) 
Social media have become one of the main sources of information, capable of reaching its 
users even indirectly, when they are browsing for other purposes. In recent years their 
algorithms have been purposefully used to distribute manipulated contents aimed at polarize 
and influence public perception. As side effect, trust in mainstream media plummeted, while 
alternative news ecosystems fuelled by extremist, sensationalist, conspiratorial content have 
flourished.160 
Algorithms are central in spreading manipulated content, as they can be purposefully exploited 
to distribute polarizing political content. Based on preferences and behaviour, highly 
personalised algorithms select what information to show in the news feed, creating a powerful 
filter bubble effect, where disinformation spread fast among homogeneous groups.161   
Algorithms deliver customized news and recommendations based on past viewing habits or 
purchase of product and service. They are programmed to spark interest and on the long run, 
lead to a more focused interaction, as all new information will be a function of past activity 
and user's preference and connections becomes path dependent. The more evident effect is the 
hardening and intensification of pre-existing biases, where information cascade of 
unchallenged evidence and oversampled arguments lead members to adopt group views, being 
                                           
159 Oliver Nachtwey, Decivilizzazione e Tendenze Regressive, La grande regressione, Feltrinelli, 2018. 
160 Michela Del Vicario, Alessandro Bessi, Fabiana Zollo, Fabio Petroni, Antonio Scala, The Spreading of 
Misinformation Online, PNAS, n. 113(3), January 2016. 
161 Vidya Narayanan, Vlad Barash, Polarization, Partisanship… 
 30 
unwilling or unable to construct persuasive counterarguments. This tendency to conform feeds 
radicalization towards more and more extreme positions.162 
Since the early days of Internet, it was easy to create communities with like-minded individuals, 
connecting people dispersed geographically. In this way, for example, particle physicists, Star 
Trek fans, gamers, music enthusiasts, or extra-terrestrial "welcomers” have used the internet to 
find each other, swap information, and stoke each other's passions. Their heated discussion 
never reached a critical mass, although, their interactions might have polarized their views and 
amplified their individual preferences.163 
Online interactions can also facilitate a complete detachment of individuals or groups from 
their geographic neighbourhoods, as radicalism is fostered by tribalism and xenophobia. Pulitzer 
Prize winner Thomas Friedman once observed that: "When you might have thought you were all 
alone with your extreme views, the Internet puts you together with a community of people from 
around the world who hate all the things and people you do. You can scrap the BBC and just 
get your news from those websites that reinforce your own stereotypes".164 
Online platforms algorithms, with their increased connectivity and improved filtering, were 
designed to connect geographically separated people and help them locate interesting or 
useful resources; instead it led to less integration, fragmented interaction and divided groups. 
Geographic boundaries have been supplanted by digital boundaries, where people spend more 
time on special interests and screen out unwanted contact. Paradoxically, the technology that 
had the potential to bridge gaps and unite communities, have saturated the human capacity 
for information processing165 creating as result virtual knowledge spaces in an increasing 
number of digitally divided groups.166   
Personalised algorithms were created to provide relevant information to users confronted with 
information overload. Paradoxically, instead of improving decision-making, personalisation 
algorithms, not being able to "replicate a spontaneous discovery of new things, ideas and 
options",167 have reduce the diversity of information creating "echo-chambers" devoid of 
consolatory information, which are considered as anomalies against the profiled interests of 
the subject.168 
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Online platforms business model relies on pushing contents that generates engagement, 
allowing them to sell this "attention" to advertisers.169 Traditional media has frequently relied on 
sensationalistic contents, but only with the advent of personalised algorithms that can measure 
what content best engages each user individually, that they could be weaponised.170 
Internet platforms have been built on a business model that monetizes attention through 
advertising, using complex statistical models to enhance engagement. However, the easiness 
of getting ads revenues on platforms, have not only provided a powerful and inexpensive 
publishing tool, but also a tool that actively promote dissemination.171  
Recommendation algorithms contribute to the propagation of false information. Even relying on 
the same data, slightly differences in the algorithms may produce different recommendations. 
Online platforms are designed to maximize the time spent and tend to weight more specific 
contents rather than comments (pro and against) to it. As a result, AI will favour that specific 
content, giving as a result an incentive to create additional material on the same tone. The 
unintended consequence is that eventually false information will be widely recommended, and 
the large amount of content will make it appear as more credible.172  
In the beginning, the financial incentive to create content through advertising revenue have 
driven a large number of users to generate political clickbait fake stories, then algorithms have 
been exploited using military hybrid-warfare strategies. Sir Tim Berners-Lee, the "inventor" of 
Internet, warned that “People are being distorted by very finely trained AI that figure out how to 
distract them. We have these dark ads that target and manipulate me and then vanish because 
I cannot bookmark them. This is not democracy. This is putting who gets selected into the 
hands of the most manipulative companies out there. We are so used to these systems being 
manipulated that people just think that is how the internet works.”173 
Propaganda has benefitted from internet platforms to efficiently disseminate to a large 
number of people. What was before an exclusive domain of states, became available to a wide 
variety of individuals and groups, and through anonymity, it provided the plausible deniability to 
present propaganda as if were not produced by state actors. Audience targeting based on big 
data analytics and a strategic manipulation of algorithms has provided a more efficient 
dissemination.174    
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 Algorithms have the power to shape what people watch, which skims and ranks billions of 
results with the purpose of keeping the user on the platform.175 The most interesting and 
overlooked example is YouTube and its 1.5 billion users in the world. Insiders describe its 
algorithms as the "largest scale and most sophisticated industrial recommendation system in 
existence", which are one of the best kept secret formulas; it has turned out to be a main 
engine for spreading disinformation. Researchers have demonstrated that YouTube 
recommendations were not neutral during the US presidential race, pushing more anti-Hillary 
videos containing the most extreme content only because the algorithm have figured out that 
edgy and hateful content was more engaging.176 According to a recent study, the impact of 
algorithms in shaping the content and the perception of people is high, in particular among 
those who have not already made-up their mind on a specific topic, and can lead towards 
choices that would have not been made.177 
Platforms algorithms are designed to maximise engagement, 178 whether this is used by product 
retailers, politicians or scammers, and does not make the difference among neo-moms, sport-
enthusiasts or neo-Nazis, because their customers are not their users.179 Online platforms have 
thrived under the 1996 Communications Decency Act, which offers complete immunity for 
false or defamatory content published by others.180 
In the case of Facebook, users were profiled not only with their behaviour on the platform 
(clicks, likes or shared content), but also collecting browsing histories or purchasing "external" 
data like financial information or offline data acquired through geolocalization. Facebook 
seems also able to create "shadow profiles" of non-users, using data from friends and 
acquaintances.181 
Google is an advertising broker that benefits from how long people stay on its platforms, 
primarily YouTube. According to a recent investigation by the Wall Street Journal, YouTube "fed 
far-right or far-left content to users who watched relatively mainstream news source" as its 
algorithms have concluded that people attention is drawn by extreme or incendiary content 
(e.g. users who searched for information on flu-vaccine were recommended anti-vaccination 
conspiracy videos).182 
Micro targeting has been used for electoral campaigns. Two notable examples are Obama 
Presidential Campaigns, and Cambridge Analytical. Both used data from users, but in two 
completely different ways. The Obama campaign collected data with a specific app, which was 
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meant for support, donation, and organization. Activists were asked permission to scan their 
photos, friends' lists, and news feeds. This data was then matched with offline data and used 
to identify voters who were likely to vote for Obama, but not willing to register and vote. This 
information was then passed to activists, who then knew who to campaign.183 
Cambridge Analytica on the other hand, collected data through a "personality quiz" app, without 
informing users that their data would have been used for political campaigns. Data collected 
was matched with psychological profiles, offline data, to micro target people with ads that 
would push them in a certain direction. As explained by Chris Wylie184 "Cambridge Analytica was 
data harvesting programs where we would pull data from users of apps and all of their friend 
networks and run that data through algorithms that could profile their personality traits and 
other psychological attributes so that we would know exactly what kind of information we 
would need to seed on to online platforms to exploit mental vulnerabilities that our algorithms 
showed that they had".185 
The role of social media for data-gathering and shaping perceptions has been recognised 
several times. Donald Trump once stated that he probably owes its success to Twitter, while 
Philippines president Rodrigo Duterte heavily relied on Facebook to crash its opponents.186 In 
France, the "gilets jaunes" protest has been fuelled by a small change in the algorithms from 
Facebook that, according to experts, together with the use of automated accounts,187 allowed 
the protest and the rage to spread more quickly.188 
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4. Russian "Active Measures" 
Psychological operations in foreign countries is nothing new, as it has been for a long time a 
tool in the arsenal of states. Approximately 2000 years ago, Chinese master strategist Sun Tzu, 
dedicated an entire chapter of his manual “The Art of War” describing how “expendable agents, 
after creating disinformation and deceptions to be planted in the field, direct that our agents 
know of the disinformation and deceptions, and spread the disinformation and deceptions to 
enemy agents”.189 Technological advances and the pervasiveness of Internet in shaping public 
opinion dramatically changed the scope, directness and the scale of activity of external 
interference. Cyberspace is being used as a powerful weapon to destabilize target countries 
through manipulated content disseminated thanks to the high connectivity, low latency, low 
cost of entry, multiple distribution points without intermediaries, and a total disregard for 
physical distance or national borders.190 
Foreign actors with malicious intent can use the peculiar structure of cyberspace to plant and 
disseminate fake stories, manipulate online content, also using an organised army of “paid 
trolls” (each controlling multiple online profiles) to distract and disinform public opinion, trashing 
the debate with “alternative facts”191, with the aim to disorient and corroborate a sense of 
doubt among the public, or shape target audience on a specific issue.192 
According to A. Kovalev and M. Bodner,193 Russian meddling with western democracies is not a 
new phenomenon. Technology has always been used to spread disinformation since the Cold 
War period. At that time, they were referred as “active measures”, described as “malign 
influence operations were well integrated into Soviet policy and involved virtually every 
element of the Soviet party and state structure, not only the KGB”. In the 1970s, KGB had 
approximately 15000 officers working on psychological and disinformation warfare, with 
estimated $4bn of annual expenditure.194 Soviet specialists used any mean possible, from 
official newspapers, to radio stations, embassies, and foreign communist parties to 
disseminate fake stories in a coordinated fashion. Each campaign was organised in three 
distinct branches: “black propaganda”, tasked to create forgeries and spread rumours; “white 
propaganda”, broadcasting stories through official media organizations; “grey propaganda” that 
disseminated disinformation through international front organizations.195 Active measures, 
focusing on target audience, sought to exploit any pre-existing fissures to polarize western 
democracies,196 and attempting multiple times to influence elections in Western Europe, like in 
1983 with the massive disinformation campaign orchestrated against then Chancellor Helmut 
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Kohl.197 During the Cold War, several bogus stories were fabricated and disseminated by the 
Soviet Union, like the CIA direct involvement in President Kennedy assassination in 1963,198 or 
US scientists that created the HIV virus199 as a biological weapon in 1983.200 
According to experts, today Russia uses malign influence operation to achieve their strategic 
ends, which include security services, TV stations, private and public companies, think tanks, 
social and religious groups, but mainly social media and internet trolls. Disinformation 
campaigns are organised to discredit politicians, independent media or democratic institutions, 
while cultural, religious, and political groups are used as a tool to disrupt social cohesion and 
infiltrate decision-making bodies.201 
According to the German Marshall Fund’s Alliance for Securing Democracy, since 2004 the 
Russian government has used cyber-attacks, disinformation, and financial influence campaigns 
to meddle with the internal affairs of most European countries. Russian methods are largely 
determined by the correlation between the strength of each country institution and its 
vulnerability to Russian influence. The strategy changes depending on the targeted country: 
towards former Soviet controlled countries, Russia acts to exert influence over pliant 
governments or weaken pro-Western leaders, in the rest of Europe it primarily seeks to 
undermine NATO and the EU, while amplifying existing political and social discord.202 The 
activities to destabilize European governments often start with attempts to build influence and 
exploit divisions at local level. This includes developing affiliations to like-minded political 
parties and Non-Governmental Organization (NGOs), establishing deep financial relationship, 
and providing ready-to-use propaganda to local media.203  
According to US State Department, "Russia effort to influence elections and referendums in 
Europe includes overt and covert support for far-left and far-right political parties, funding from 
groups and NGOs, and making small, low-profile investments in key economic sectors to build 
political influence over time. Its tactics focus on exploiting internal discord in an effort to break 
consensus on the importance of core institutions".204 Russia has adopted a sophisticated tactic 
in cultivating relationships and establishing cooperation agreements with some of the more 
mainstream far-right parties in Europe,205 which include regular meetings and collaboration 
                                           
197 Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Soviet Strategy to Derail US INF Deployment: Soviet 
Active Measures in the United States, 1986-87, reprinted in the Congressional Record, 133 Cong. Rec. H34262 
(Dec. 9, 1987) (statement of Rep. C.W. Bill Young). 
198 Gordon Corera, Cold War fake news: Why Russia lied over Aids and JFK, BBC News, 1 April 2017. 
199 Thomas Boghardt, Soviet Bloc Intelligence and Its AIDS Disinformation Campaign, Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 
53, No. 4, Dec. 2009. 
200 Fletcher Schoen & Christopher Lamb, Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One 
Interagency Group Made a Major Difference, Institute for National Strategic Studies, n. 20, vol. 34, June 2012. 
201 Mark Galeotti, Controlling Chaos: How Russia Manages its Political War in Europe, European Council on Foreign 
Relations, Aug. 2017. 
202 U.S. Department of State, Report to Congress on Efforts by the Russian Federation to Undermine Elections in 
Europe and Eurasia, Pursuant to the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act of 2017 (P.L. 115-
44), Nov. 7, 2017. 
203 Rachel Oswald, Reality Rocked: Info Wars Heat Up Between U.S. and Russia, CQ, June 12, 2017. 
204 Committee on Foreign Relations of the USA, Putin's Asymmetric Assault on Democracy in Russia and Europe: 
Implications for US National Security, 10 January 2018. 
205 In details: Austria (Freedom Party), Hungary (Jobbik), Italy (Northern League), France (National Front), and 
Germany (AfD). 
 36 
where suitable on economic, business and political projects, together with organizational, 
political, and media expertise assistance.206  
Different narratives are also used to attract different groups: "European far-right nationalists 
are seduced by anti-EU and anti-establishment messages, with a combination of extreme 
nationalism, commitment to law-and-order, traditional family values that sometimes digress to 
anti-immigrant, anti-Semitic, or anti-Islamic sentiments. On the other hand, far-left are brought 
in by tales of fighting US hegemony".207 
According to C. Paul and M. Matthews, Russia usually employs two main external propaganda 
outlets: RT, which focuses on television news programming, and Sputnik, a radio and internet 
news network. They also target a diverse audience at the same time: far-right and far-left 
parties; anti-establishment movements; environmentalists; civil rights activists; extreme 
religious groups; and sometimes minority groups.208 
In November 2016, the European Parliament adopted a resolution stating that disinformation 
operations in Europe aim at "distorting truths, provoking doubt, dividing Member states, 
engineering a strategic split between the European Union and its North American partners and 
paralyzing the decision-making process, discrediting the EU institutions and transatlantic 
partnerships and undermining and eroding the European narrative". At their core, Russian 
operations seek to challenge the very concept of objective truth, using four simple tactics: 
dismiss the critic; distort the fact; distract from the main issue; dismay the audience.209 
In 1998, Russia presented to the UN General Assembly a proposal for a resolution on cyber-
security. The proposal was dismissed at the time, but it gave an idea of Russia’s strategic 
thinking: cyber-attacks and information warfare were considered on an operational continuum. 
Its integrated and holistic approach to the information space has the ultimate strategic 
objective of "undermining the cohesion and the stability of NATO and the European Union in 
order to renegotiate - from a better position - a new European security architecture".210  This is 
restated in the current Russian Military doctrine (known as the "Gerasimov Doctrine"), where 
"informational attacks become the system integrator of both kinetic and non-kinetic military 
means, as well as of government and non-government actors". They are perceived as the most 
cost-effective tool of non-nuclear coercion, aiming at infiltrate, disorganize, disrupt or destroy 
adversary state functioning, while deceiving the opponent through psychological subversion, 
discrediting its decision makers, and disorienting and demoralizing its citizens and armed 
forces.211 
According to a report from US Senate, President Putin "sees successful democracies, especially 
those along Russia’s periphery, as threats to his regime because they present an attractive 
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alternative to his rule. He has thus made it a priority of his regime to attack the democracies of 
Europe and undermine the transatlantic alliance. State propaganda has played up examples of 
Western failures in an attempt to undermine the credibility of a Western-style alternative 
system of government. It has been suggesting that corruption, violation of Human Rights, 
election's manipulation is endemic, and that liberal Democracy does not really exist and 
therefore is a goal not worth pursuing".212 
The ecosystem created by active measures operation, provides Russia with enough degree of 
deniability. In fact, all actors involved may appear to be competing or contradicting each other, 
creating the impression that Russia leadership could not possibly be coordinating everything. 
This is achieved working through a vast array of cut-outs, corporations’ oligarchs, and proxies, in 
a layered structure that reports (directly or indirectly) to a well-designed structure close to the 
Kremlin.213 
According to C. Watts, Russia’s disinformation system operates by blending state sponsored 
propaganda with sustained social media engagement with targeted audiences. Public opinion 
manipulation is organised through false accounts that pretend to look like the targeted 
audience, the use of social bots, troll-farms, with a coordinated activity to advance Russian 
political and social narratives, undermining popular support and faith in liberal democracy.214 
Recent studies have identified Russian activities even during the heated discussions that 
followed the cinematic release of Star Wars: The Last Jedi. Russian trolls had engaged 
fandoms with the purpose to create division and spreading messages not only of political 
nature, but also sexist and racist, in the attempt to persuade other users that the movie put 
their values under attack.215   
In 2017 Russian defence minister Sergey Shoigu announced that "information operations forces 
have been established that are expected to be a far more effective tool than all we used 
before for counter-propaganda purposes".216  
Russia interference activity has been centralized to the St. Petersburg based Internet Research 
Agency,217 which employs over a thousand agents. It first targeted Russian and Ukrainian 
citizens, to later expand its activities in Europe and US. The US Department of Justice has 
revealed that only the operation to manipulate political discourse in America had a budget of 
over $25 million and continued all over 2018. It has been established that during the US 
presidential campaign, Russian operation reached 126 million people on Facebook, 20 million 
on Instagram, 1.4 on Twitter, and uploaded more than 1000 videos on YouTube, reaching 
millions of users. The hostile narratives, organised per themes, primarily based on social issues, 
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were cross-platform shared to be better emphasized. The topics were presented to reinforce 
community and culture pride, exploiting the tribalism within each targeted community. 
Narratives were designed to erode trust in mainstream media and institutions. Automated 
accounts were primarily news-focused, while human-operated account were used to engage 
with users (regular users as well as influencers) in the attempt to influence opinion and shape 
narratives, using divisions in society and cognitive biases. Most of the content used to build 
these hostile narratives was not always objectively false. Much of it was not even classifiable 
as hate speech, but it was intended to reinforce tribalism, to polarize and divide, specifically 
designed to exploit social fractures, creating a distorted perception of reality by eroding the 
trust in media, institutions and eventually, democracy itself.218    
The Internet Research Agency used the most advanced techniques of digital marketing to 
spread disinformation and propaganda on multiple platforms. This strategy enabled them to 
reach and even wider audience; it reinforced the credibility of the account used as their 
message was consistent across platforms, giving them more legitimacy.219 
On the last days before the Brexit vote, over 156.000 Russian operated accounts massively 
tweeted to encourage Britons to vote leave. According to a study from the Swansea University 
and Berkley, in less than 48 hours these accounts controlled by the International Research 
Agency posted more than 45000 messages, many directed against Muslims residents.220 
Russia tried to influence also the outcome of the Italian referendum on Constitutional reform in 
2016, by producing fake stories that have been widely shared on social networks. 221 
It has to be said that Russia has only exploited an existing condition of social mistrust, weak 
institutions, and detached elites, which make European countries and the US vulnerable to its 
meddling strategy. Domestic actors have exploited such condition too, willingly spreading viral 
disinformation to a greater audience.222 
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5. EU Institutions Coordinated Response to Disinformation: an Overview 
The European Council first recognised the threat of online disinformation campaigns in 
2015,223 when it asked the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy to address the disinformation campaigns by Russia. The East Strategic Communication 
Task Force was then set up to address and raise awareness on the matter.  
On 26 April 2018, the Commission adopted its Communication on “Tackling Online 
Disinformation: a European Approach”,224 which defines the challenges online disinformation 
present to our democracies and outlines five clusters of actions for private and public 
stakeholders that respond to these challenges. As a follow-up, in September 2018 online 
platforms (Facebook, Google, YouTube, Twitter), a free-software community (Mozilla), and the 
advertising industry agreed on a Code of Practice on disinformation to increase online 
transparency and protect citizens, especially with a view to the 2019 European Parliament 
elections and more than 50 presidential, national or local/regional elections being held in 
Member States by 2020, but also in a more long-term perspective. The signatories committed 
to specific actions to be carried out before the 2019 European Parliament, to share relevant 
company best practices as well as milestones for the overall implementation of the Code in the 
EU. The Code of Practice is meant to create a more transparent, trustworthy and accountable 
online ecosystem and protect users from disinformation. The Commission will, with the help of 
the European Regulators Group for Audio-visual Media Services (ERGA), monitor the 
implementation by the signatories and will regularly inform on whether and to what extent 
individual platforms are meeting these commitments. The Commission will also carry out a 
comprehensive assessment of the Code's initial 12-month period by the end of 2019. 
In addition, an independent network of fact-checkers was established to increase the ability to 
detect and expose disinformation, and sustained efforts are being made at Union and national 
level to support media literacy. The European Commission also adopted measures225 to secure 
free and fair European elections and recommended the use of sanctions where appropriate, 
including for the illegal use of personal data to influence the outcome of the elections. In 
addition, it called on Member States to take the steps needed to preserve the integrity of their 
electoral systems and infrastructure and test them ahead of the European elections.  
Furthermore, the Joint Communication on Countering Hybrid Threats226 in June 2018 set up the 
Hybrid Fusion Cell within the European External Action Service to act as a single focus for the 
analysis of hybrid threats. It also led to the setting up of the European Centre of Excellence for 
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Countering Hybrid Threats in Finland,227 which shares best practices and supports the activities 
of the Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in this field. 
The European Council228 then invited the "High Representative and the Commission to present, 
in cooperation with the Member States and in line with the March 2015 European Council 
conclusions, an action plan by December 2018 with specific proposals for a coordinated 
response to the challenge of disinformation, including appropriate mandates and sufficient 
resources for the relevant EEAS Strategic Communications teams" and to protect the Union’s 
democratic systems and combat disinformation, including in the context of the upcoming 
European elections”229. 
The European Commission and the High Representative adopted the Joint Communication 
setting out an “Action Plan against Disinformation” on 5 December 2018. 
The Action Plan responds to the calls of the European Council in June and October 2018 to 
develop a coordinated response to the challenges in this field, both within the EU and in its 
neighbourhood, especially in view of the forthcoming European elections. It builds on existing 
Commission initiatives and the work of the East Strategic Communication Task Force of the 
European External Action Service. It sets out actions to be taken by the Commission and the 
High Representative, with the assistance of the European External Action Service, in cooperation 
with Member States and the European Parliament. Other actions aim to strengthen coordinated 
and joint responses to disinformation, to mobilise the private sector to make sure that it 
delivers on its commitments in this field, and to improve the resilience of society to the 
challenges that disinformation creates.  
On 12 March 2019 the European Parliament adopted new rules on political campaigning, 
including dissuading and penalising EU-level political organisations that deliberately misuse 
personal data in European election campaigns. The Council adopted the new provisions on 19 
March 2019.230 The new rules take the form of amendments to the 2014 regulation governing 
the statute and funding of European political parties and foundations and are binding and 
directly applicable in all Member States as of 25 March 2019. Also on 12 March 2019, the 
European Parliament strongly condemned in a resolution the increasingly aggressive actions of 
Russia, China, Iran and North Korea and others in this context, “which seek to undermine the 
foundations and principles of European democracies as well as the sovereignty of all Eastern 
Partnership countries, as well as influence elections and support extremist movements, taking 
into account that the scale of cyberattacks is constantly growing”.231  
Still in March 2019, the Rapid Alert System, which was one of the key deliverables under the 
Action Plan, was launched. The Rapid Alert System aims to strengthen coordination, analysis 
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and joint responses to disinformation through creating a dedicated digital platform for a 
network of contact points from the EU Member States and the EU institutions, working in close 
cooperation with the European Election Cooperation Network. This will facilitate sharing of data 
and assessment, to enable common situational awareness, coordinated attribution and 
response and ensure time and resource efficiency. The Commission and the High 
Representative will ensure regular exchange of information and best practices with key 
partners, including within the G7 and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. 
Two weeks ahead of the European Parliament elections, the EU Heads of State or Government, 
who met for the informal European Council of 9 May 2019 in the Romanian city of Sibiu, 
discussed safeguarding democracies, including through the fight against disinformation, as one 
of the next overarching priorities that should guide the work of the EU for the years to come.  
 
Figure 5 - Source: European Commission 
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Case Study 
6. The 2018 Italian General Election 
For centuries, Italy has been considered a political laboratory, anticipating trends that have later 
affected the rest of Europe.  
During the late Middle-Ages, the political experience of free-cities has been an extraordinary 
example of civil coexistence and institutions building. It spread values such as: respect for 
individual liberties; promotion and governance of the common good; use of the majority rule in 
collegial procedures; justice administered under the rule of law; and openness to the political 
participation of the lower classes,232 that has generated institutional values and practices, 
which only centuries later would have been translated into standards of legal-political 
civilization. 233   
From the XIV century, the Italian humanism, a political expression of a bourgeoisie that has 
consolidated its heritage and aspirations to political power, was part of the formation of 
national monarchies.234 
In the XX Century, Italy was the birthplace for the tragic authoritarian experience of Mussolini's 
fascism, whose legacy still globally resonates in society today. In more recent times, soon after 
the fall of the Berlin Wall, Italy was the first European country to experience the rise of a major 
anti-establishment political party. Silvio Berlusconi's Forza Italia (EPP) was in fact regarded by 
many scholars as the pioneer of "neoliberal populism" in Europe.235  
 
6.1 The Results 
On 4 March 2018 elections were held for the renewal of the Italian Parliament. The results 
have completely reshaped the country's political landscape. 
The 5-Star Movement (Movimento 5 Stelle - EFDD) won more than 30 percent of the votes, 
becoming the most voted party in Italy. The League (Lega - ENF) with 17 percent overtook 
Forza Italia (EPP), which gained 14 percent. Together with Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d’Italia – 
ECR), which slightly exceeded 4 percent, the centre-right was the most voted coalition. The 
Democratic Party (Partito Democratico – S&D) recorded the worst defeat in its history, only 
getting 18 percent. Former European Commissioner Emma Bonino’s +Europa (ALDE) got just 
over two percent. Free and Equal (Liberi e Uguali – GUE/NGL) barely passed the minimal 
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threshold required by the electoral law to gain seats in the Parliament. The abstention rate was 
the highest since 1948, with a turnout of only 72.9 percent.236 
The political network mapping (figure 6), based on Twitter interactions,237 shows a high 
polarization in five, distinct, areas. On top, the red area is Free and Equals (GUE/NGL); on the 
left, the purple area is the Democratic Party (S&D); on the bottom, Brothers of Italy (ECR) is 
compressed between the bigger green area representing the League (ENF), and the blue area 
representing Forza Italia (EPP). On the right, the orange area represents the 5 Stars Movement 
(EFDD).  
                                           
236 Ministero dell'Interno, Risultati Elezioni Politiche 4 Marzo 2018. 
237 Data collection methodology explained in Chapter 7. 
Figure 6 - Network Mapping. Source: European Commission Joint Research Centre 
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6.2 The Role of Social Media during the Electoral Campaign 
Data on active social media users in Italy shows 
the prominent role of Facebook, with 35.7 million 
accounts, followed by YouTube (24 million); 
Instagram (22.3 million); and Twitter (8 million). 
On average, 43 million Italians are online daily.238  
For the first time in Italian history, online social 
media played an active role during the electoral 
campaign. However, communication strategies 
varied from party to party. The Democratic Party 
(S&D) decided not to have a centralized 
communication strategy, leaving complete freedom to all candidates. Former Prime Minister 
Matteo Renzi was the only one able to achieve a personal high engagement of users in the first 
months of the campaign; however, according to experts; the overall party communication 
looked chaotic and sometimes not consistent.239 On the other hand, Forza Italia (EPP) and Free 
and Equals (GUE/NGL) have used social media in a rather static manner, as a simple showcase 
of electoral events, resulting in an overall low engagement.  
The League (ENF) and above all the 5 Stars Movement (EFDD), adopted instead a very modern 
and dynamic communication strategies, which resulted in high engagement and produced most 
of the online traffic.  
 
6.2.1 Focus on the League Strategy 
The League has used an automated system to monitor Salvini's social networks, analyse which 
posts and tweets got the best results, and what kind of people interacted with them. “La 
Bestia” ("The Beast") is the nickname given to it by its creator, Luca Morisi, when it was 
conceived in 2014. It became operative in 2016.240  
According to Morisi, “La Bestia” is a set of software for collaborative work, automation of cross-
posting activities, creation of graphics, advertising of events, and monitoring of news.241 It was 
later refined, with the analysis of Facebook and Twitter posts and coordinated with a mailing 
list to engage non-social media users. According to experts, the communication team, using 
also automated accounts, amplified allegedly semi-truthful news, making them “viral” and part 
of a “shared culture”, confirmed by charismatic resources considered honest and reliable, and 
exploiting cognitive failures, making then difficult to challenge due to the large number of 
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Figure 7 - Social Media Users in Italy 
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shares. The whole system was centralized around its leader. The strategy aimed at immediately 
occupy the media space, commenting first the news of the day, forcing traditional media, 
opponents, and allies to run after and react. Strong messages were used to immediately 
polarize the discussion, provoking "negative feelings" - anger, fear and aggression - in order to 
"lower the guard" of the listener.242 
The League was the only one to use “Gamification”243 during the electoral campaign, with a 
game called "Vinci Salvini" (Win Salvini). In a nutshell, the fastest Facebook users to put a like 
to the posts of the leader gained points, which allowed the first classified to get a phone call 
from Salvini himself, a selfie244 posted on the official Facebook page, and even a private 
meeting with the leader. The real goal was to generate engagement, in order to trick the 
platform algorithm to give greater visibility to what Salvini published, making the propaganda 
machine more effective. 
According to R. Luna, Salvini has always looked carefully at Trump and the League has 
persistently sought out Steve Bannon, whom he personally met in March 2018. Before the 
Italian elections, rumours were circulating about the opening of a Cambridge Analytica office in 
Italy, aborted following the scandal that involved the company. At the time, the company 
claimed to have "realized a project for an Italian party that had been successful for the last 
time in the 80s". That party has never been identified.245 
 
6.2.2 Focus on 5 Star Movement Strategy 
The idea behind the communication strategy adopted by the 5 Stars Movement (and the party 
itself) dates back at least twenty years, and it is rather fascinating.  
At the end of the 1990s, a small IT consultancy company called Webegg began experimenting 
with some consensus distribution techniques within corporate intranet. The mastermind was 
Gianroberto Casaleggio, the future founder of the M5S. In those years Casaleggio analysed 
various company intranets and observed that most were used for internal communications 
only, but some were dedicated to knowledge management, centred on the concept of 
community. Those had the power to influence opinions and create communities of people. 246  
This seems obvious now, but at the end of the 1990s it was substantially unknown to society 
and to public debate. The World Wide Web was invented by Sir Tim Berners-Lee only a few 
years earlier in 1989,247 Google was just born (1997) and social networks would arrive only 
many years later (Facebook 2004, Twitter 2006). At the end of the 1990s, forums and 
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newsgroups were mostly used by experts to discuss in controlled environments. These forums 
were the first ground for social engineering experiments, where Casaleggio’s team sought to 
condition the opinions of unsuspecting users. The strategy used was quite simple: one member 
of the group launched the discussion on one theme, while another responded with a contrasting 
position. The others group members came together to support the discussion until the other 
employees joined the discussion, creating what Casaleggio called the "avalanche of consent". 
These experiments were repeated hundreds of times, each time inserting background noises or 
piloted distortions of the opinion to test the various points of view. The ultimate aim was to 
understand what were the most effective methods to manipulate opinions and create 
consensus, maintaining a semblance of democratic discussion.248 
The experience in Webegg ended in 2004, when the company was sold. However, Casaleggio 
understood the revolution of the newly born social networks. He identified in Beppe Grillo - a 
comedian who had great success in the 80s, then reinvented himself as a satirical flogger of 
political corruption - as the beacon to attract that part of disillusioned population that felt 
abandoned by politics. The 5 Stars Movement, founded a few years later, should be considered 
as a total political novelty.249  
In a country where mainstream parties are still organised following the twentieth century 
traditions - with the only difference represented by Forza Italia, the semi-liquid party centred on 
the figure of its leader, Silvio Berlusconi - the 5 Stars Movement is instead a complete 
revolution: a party completely disconnected from the territory, where assemblies take place in 
different places chosen at the time, without overt leadership, all coordinated online using 
appropriate platforms.250 
In 2013, a book of quotes by Gianroberto Casaleggio, entitled "Tu Sei Rete" stated "Until a few 
years ago, the relationships between people were random, while the life and evolution of 
networks follow precise rules. The knowledge of these rules allows us to use networks to our 
advantage".251 
Casaleggio immediately figured out the importance of two elements of a network: nodes and 
connections. The network, in fact, although not centralized, can be influenced and partially 
controlled upstream. According to Casaleggio, having defined the rules at local level, it is 
possible to drive users towards an objective. Albert Laszlo Barabasi, one of the main experts on 
network theory, argued that nodes with multiple connections tend to attract more and more of 
them, in what he called the "preferential attachment" and the "rich get richer effect".252 In such 
political organization, indications are given to subjects in strategic positions, so to appear to be 
bottom-up to users. Usually, in the expansion process, networks reach a critical point in which 
the nodes moved too far away from the centre and becoming autonomous, making them 
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vulnerable or exposed to external infiltration. For this reason, Casaleggio had identified key 
figures with the task of keeping united distinct groups within the organization.253 
A highly loyal community was built in a short time, made of in-born and in-grown "influencers", 
young media leaders who collect hundreds of thousands of followers on Facebook, then to be 
elected first in local institutions, then in the Parliament. Their public speeches were designed to 
be shared on the various official web platforms, generating traffic, visualizations and attracting 
new sympathizers. The strategy designed by Casaleggio is rather simple: channel the feeling of 
the people online and govern it without appearing directly.254 
The contents posted on the various platforms controlled by Casaleggio are analysed to 
understand which has greater grip on users. The slogans used by the 5 Stars Movement, and 
even earlier for Grillo's shows, are designed for serial repetition and to intercept the widespread 
malaise that political parties and media are not able to see. People's anger existed long before 
the 5 Stars Movement, but now these protests can be channelled against political parties and 
newspapers, which gradually lost credibility and respect. The M5S rides these vulnerabilities, 
setting up information wars, attacking the media to get away from any criticism, anticipating 
for years Trump's "fake news strategy" or Nigel Farage attacks to the press during the 
campaign for Brexit.255 
The social composition of the 5 Stars Movement gathers workers, self-employed workers, 
private employees and students. The level of education is medium-high, with many 
graduates.256 Its post-ideological stance is not based on ideological principles, but on the 
preferences of its voters. The form influences the substance, the possession of data is central 
to adjust the message, or to create very effective diversions in times of difficulty. The 5 Stars 
Movement represents a revolution because it is the first case of political party that understands 
the central role of data and how to exploit it, sometimes even in unconventional ways.257 
However, data alone is useless if it is not combined with a flexible interpreting tool, powerful 
enough to identify the most interesting topics, the most influential users of the community, 
who is still undecided, but above all, allows knowing with great precision on what vulnerabilities 
to leverage to gain consensus. The Movement's propaganda machine is based on groups, 
pages, often unofficial accounts that take advantage of the structure of online platforms to 
distribute their contents. The network is flooded and saturated with memes and obsessively 
repeated messages. Its targets were not only political opponents, but anyone who even gave 
the impression of opposing the Movement.258  
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6.3 Russia and Italy: an Overview 
Italy has a long-time tradition of good relations with Russia. During the cold war, the Italian 
communist party (one of the largest in Western Europe together with the French one) had 
strong ties with the Soviet Union. Moreover, Silvio Berlusconi has never hidden his personal 
friendship with Vladimir Putin.259 But something has changed in the last years. 
According to A. Guerrera,260 within anti-establishment parties, Putin became a powerful symbol 
of nationalism and re-establishment of traditional identitarian values against globalist effort to 
weaken and dissolve it. Some of these parties have become strong advocates of a pro-Kremlin 
foreign policy agenda, and have extensively resorted to fake news and conspiracy theories for 
their campaigns, often directly drawn from Russian state-owned media outlets.  
According to an analysis published by BuzzFeed News,261 during the 2016 constitutional 
referendum,262 the 5 Stars Movement allegedly used a ‘’sprawling network of websites and 
social media accounts that [were] spreading fake news, conspiracy theories, and pro-Kremlin 
stories to millions of people", including videos specifically created by RT.263 Unlike the League, 
the 5 Stars Movement has only recently shifted toward a pro-Russian foreign policy, but has 
never openly publicized contacts and meetings with Russian officials. Nevertheless, since 2015, 
Russian state-owned news outlets like RT, Sputnik, have begun to increase 5 Stars Movement 
visibility, with interviews to its leaders,264 and the strategic narrative (which included 
disinformation and conspiracy theories) depicting Italy as a country on the verge of chaos, that 
was later echoed by the extensive network of 5 Stars Movement websites and social media 
accounts.265 
Although there are not known official financial relationship between the 5 Stars Movement and 
Russia, in 2017 an Italian national security official told Business Insider "I think some of our 
political parties are vulnerable to infiltration. They do not have the experience, the antibodies, 
to fend off such formidable intelligence services".266 
Russia has well established formal political ties with a number of populist and extreme-right 
political parties: In 2017, ruling party Russia United has signed a cooperation agreement with 
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the League, where they agreed to develop ties in the Council of Europe,267 the OSCE,268 and 
promote business links between the two countries.269  
In the last decades, many extreme-right and neo-fascist movements have been in contact with 
Russian ultranationalists, sharing the same ideas on the moral and spiritual degradation of 
modern western society.270 Among the most influential people was Russian philosopher 
Aleksandr Dugin,271 who began as a fringe figure, but has briefly entered the mainstream 
political scene. He has been frequently invited to the League's sponsored conferences, which 
made his ideas better known in Italy.272 
Unlike what happened in other Western countries, Russian meddling in Italian elections has 
chosen different less-invasive measures, perhaps having considered that an aggressive 
campaign was not the most effective strategy in an already highly polarized political arena. 
However, citizens' awareness on Russian cyber-warfare activities is low and sometimes 
dismissed as "exaggerated" by several journalists and political commentators.  
 
6.4 Analysis of Social Media Data 
The growing frustration and anger with the Italian establishment has fuelled the resurgence of 
populist parties, which eventually achieved a major electoral success. The League was able to 
shift its target from southern Italians to concentrate on strong opposition to immigration, Islam, 
the European Union, and the refugees fleeing from Syria and other war-torn regions.273  
On the other hand, the electoral success of the 5 Stars Movement should not be intended only 
as a reaction from the frustration of the economic losers of globalization, but it includes also 
the cultural losers, it is the result of the conflict between the suburbs against the centre or the 
excluded against the included. Populism was fuelled not only by economic crises, but also by 
political crises that may be independent of the bad economic trend. In Italy, the political crisis 
preceded the economic one, making the 5 Stars Movement an anomalous case in Europe.274 
The main narratives used during the electoral campaign were: security, immigration, and the 
economic situation. According to a study from Istituto Cattaneo, one of the keys to the success 
of the 5 Star Movement was to better address "marginal social sectors that have suffered the 
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difficulties of the economic crisis, 
defying the left even in terms of 
claims and material promises".275 
The brutal murder of Pamela 
Mastropietro in Macerata was 
exploited by the League to push its 
anti-immigration agenda.276  The 
hate-crime that followed some days 
after, committed by Luca Traini (a 
former League candidate for local 
office) in the same city,277 was 
therefore perceived by far-right 
supporters as not driven by racism or 
intolerance, but as evidence of 
citizens' frustration against 
cosmopolitan elites, allegedly 
responsible of encouraging an 
uncontrolled mass migration.278 
A sentiment analysis of shared 
messages during the elections, made 
by Sociometrica using artificial 
intelligence, showed that an overall 
53.3% of sentiments were negative, 
31.1% were neutral, while only 15.6% 
expressed a fully positive 
sentiment.279  
A recent research conducted by 
Ipsos280 on people's perceptions has 
established that Italy is the European 
country with the most distorted 
perception of facts, however a large 
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number of Italians believe they can recognize fake stories.281 
Polls conducted during the electoral campaign have shown a generalized pessimism towards 
the future (figure 8), but also an aversion towards immigrants by the voters of right-wing 
parties and the 5 Stars Movement (figure 9), together with a low level of trust in the state and 
European institutions (figure 10).282 
 
 
Figure 10 - Source: IPSOS 
 
6.4.1 Analysis of Most Relevant News Outlets 
During the electoral campaign, traditional media still played a prominent role in the information 
diet of citizens. The analysis of the most shared news sources by political area (figure 11)283 
shows a general diffuse presence of mainstream media, although hyper-partisan sources held 
a notable role, in particular for the 5 Stars Movement.  
Among mainstream media outlets, La Repubblica and Corriere della Sera were shared by a 
politically cross-partisan audience, while other media appeared to be more relevant inside well-
defined political areas. On the left, along with partisan outlets like Democatica (website 
managed by the Democratic Party), nextquotidiano and Huffington Post were among the most 
shared sources. On the right, Il Giornale (owned by Berlusconi's family), and conservative outlet 
Libero Quotidiano, were the most shared along with Il Populista, a media outlet very close to 
                                           
281 IPSOS, Fake news, filter bubbles, post-truth and trust, 2019.  
282 Demos, Elezioni Politiche 2018, Analisi dei Risultati, April 2018. 
283 Methodology explained in chapter 7. 
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Matteo Salvini. For the 5 Stars Movement, Il Fatto Quotidiano is among the most shared media 
sources together with partisan websites managed directly by the Movement. 
It is worth noting that the only non-Italian media shared during the electoral campaign were 
The Guardian on the left, and Breitbart and Sputnik on the right. 
The analysis of the overall outlets shared (figure 12) shows the large amount of information 
coming from hyper-partisan sources that probably shaped public perceptions and reinforced 
groups' bias.  
 
 
Figure 11 - Source: European Commission Joint Research Centre 
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Figure 12 - Source: European Commission Joint Research Centre 
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6.5 Monitoring the Narratives 
During the last three weeks of the electoral campaign, Amnesty International Italy monitored 
the social profiles of all candidates, reporting the use of stereotypes, offensive statements, 
racism, discriminatory and incitement to violence targeting vulnerable groups as migrants and 
refugees, Roma, LGBTQI people, women, Jewish and Islamic communities. 
According to their report, 51% of the statements were to be attributed to candidates of the 
League, 27% to Brothers of Italy, 13% to Forza Italia, and 2% to the 5 Stars Movement. The 
central theme on the right, with around 91% of the statements, targeted migrants. 32% 
conveyed fake news and altered data, 10% concerned the issue of security, and 7% the issue 
of reception, with immigration identified as a "social bomb", able to lead to "social conflict" and 
"war at home ".284 
Anti-establishment and Euro-scepticism were the main topics for the 5 Stars Movement, which 
presented itself as the alternative to the old parties. According to a study, at the end of 2016 
there were almost 600 pages, accounts and groups supporting the 5 Stars Movement on 
Facebook that reached almost 3 million people. An organised network, where the demonization 
of the political adversary, disinformation operations to destroy the reputation of someone, 
memes, and coordinated trolling has been aggregated around some big issues: The Democratic 
Party and its leaders, immigrants, the European institutions and the Euro.285  
Far-right groups often used anti-Muslim propaganda, sometimes pushing conspiracy theories 
featuring Jews supporting a secret plot for the invasion of Europe. In many statements, 
Hungarian billionaire George Soros was described as "one of the most depraved and dangerous 
person of our time, responsible for the invasion of Negroid and Semitic hordes. He is the enemy 
of Western civilization, of the nation-state and of the white European man. His aim is to build a 
rainbow coalition composed of homosexuals, feminists, Muslims and Marxists who hate to 
work. The only one to oppose him is Vladimir Putin”. 286 During the electoral campaign, a 
considerable amount of anti-Soros messages where shared. 
Figure 13 shows how the four monitored narratives (Migration, Europe, Vaccination, and 
Financial System) were exploited during the electoral campaign. Compulsory vaccination for 
students was widely discussed particularly in January,287 while migration spiked in February, 
after the killing of Pamela Mastropietro and the following hate crime committed by Luca Traini 
in Macerata.288 European institution were constantly discussed among pro-Europe and 
Eurosceptics candidates, in particular after statements made by European Commission officers 
on Italian elections.289 
                                           
284 Amnesty International Italia, Il Barometro dell'Odio, 2018. 
285 Jacopo Iacoboni, Ecco la cyber propaganda pro M5S.La procura indaga sull’account chiave, La Stampa, 16 Nov 
2016. 
286 Slavoj Zizek, La Tentazione Populista, La Grande Regressione, Feltrinelli, 2018. 
287 Andrea Gagliardi, Scontro sui vaccini, Salvini: toglieremo obbligo. Lorenzin: estremismo dell’incompetenza, Il 
Sole 24 Ore, 10 Jan 2018. 
288 Un uomo ha sparato a degli stranieri per le strade di Macerata, Il Post, 3 Feb 2018. 
289 e.g. ANSA, Allarme Moscovici: In Italia c'è un rischio politico per l'Ue, 17 Jan 2018. 
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Figure 13 - Source: European Commission Joint Research Centre. 
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Three main narratives were used during the electoral campaign (figure 14). Migration was 
described in a relatively negative manner, with more than 55 per cent of messages using 
derogatory terms. Discussions on European institution were mostly focused on the Euro and its 
effects on Italian economy in the last two decades. 
 57 
 
Figure 14 - Source: European Commission Joint Research Centre 
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During the electoral campaign, misinformation, disinformation, and factual stories were 
embedded together into more complex narratives. Citizens' vulnerabilities were targeted with 
an overtly anti-elite and anti-media campaign that embraced strong positions on: migration 
management; élites vs. people; EU and financial Institutions; international alliances; and 
intolerance against specific groups.  
Supporters of the 5 Stars Movement and the League were effective in shifting the news 
agenda towards specific stories, such as immigration, corruption, or state's failure in protecting 
those in need (low income families; unemployed; retired; etc.), during the last months of the 
electoral campaign. 
Figure 15 shows the 4000 most shared news on social media during the electoral campaign. 
They were divided into three groups:  
 Fake, for those containing false information, as controlled by fact-checkers.  
 Problematic, for those with misleading, oversimplified, half-truth contents, and partisan 
op-ed designed to manipulate readers' perceptions.  
 Factual based news. 
   
This complex information environment was used to push narratives, amplified by cross-
platform engagement. False stories, which constitute on average one third of the total 
narrative, served as "honeypot" to attract users' attention in an oversaturated information 
environment, and to periodically reinforce group’s engagement and loyalty. Problematic content 
(half-truth, oversimplified, misleading) was used to facilitate partisan message deliverance, 
while factual based content was used to reinforce the narrative against external attacks, like 
fact-checkers or mainstream media.  
Figure 15 shows the main identified narratives: migration; European Institutions; attacks 
against political opponents; Intolerance (against LGBTQI, anti-Semitism, anti-feminism, anti-
minorities, etc.). Electoral Fraud stories came up during the last days of the campaign and 
represent the “control group”,290 as it was made-up mostly by fake content. It consists of a 
“traditional” conspiracy theory that got no credibility and was immediately “debunked” by fact-
checkers.   
 
                                           
290 A control group in a scientific experiment is a group separated from the rest of the experiment, where the 
independent variable being tested cannot influence the results. 
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Figure 15 - Source: European Commission Joint Research Centre; Buzzsumo for SkyTg24 
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7. Network Mapping of Italian Political Areas. Methodology 
The goal was to provide a graphical representation of the communities active on the social 
media in supporting political parties and leaders. The social network investigated was Twitter. 
Starting from a root set of influential political accounts, almost equally distributed among the 
five main political areas which competed in the elections, their neighbourhood network was 
explored in order to retrieve the most active users who followed or retweeted them during the 
period January / March 2018 (11 weeks).  
The results have been mapped into a graph where the nodes are all the Twitter accounts 
(including the root set), and the edges connecting them are weighted proportionally to the 
number of observed retweets.  
Afterwards, using Gephi,291 the graph has been partitioned with the Louvain algorithm292 so to 
identify communities, and rendered using a force-directed layout to better highlight the degree of 
intra-community and inter-community relationships (figure 8). 
 
Root set: 
@orfini @emmabonino @gasparripdl @staff_M_Fedriga 
@pdnetwork @carlosibilia @GuidoCrosetto @DaniloToninelli 
@LegaSalvini @GiorgiaMeloni @maumartina @AntoniniMauro 
@civati @forza_italia @NFratoianni @carlaruocco1 
@stefanoesposito @ManlioDS @Ignazio_LaRussa @distefanoTW 
@matteorenzi @CasaPoundItalia @DSantanche @FratellidItaIia 
@beppe_grillo @lauraboldrini @RobertoMaroni_ @PietroGrasso 
@renatobrunetta @AlemannoTW @AndreaOrlandosp @zaiapresidente 
@Roberto_Fico @matteosalvinimi @BeaLorenzin @virginiaraggi 
@serracchiani @AndreaRomano9 @bobogiac @CarloCalenda 
@luigidimaio @Mov5Stelle @meb @Noiconsalvini 
@pbersani @emanuelefiano @mariannamadia @PossibileIt 
@dariofrance @robersperanza @Storace @berlusconi 
@giamma71 @borghi_claudio @RobertoFioreFN @liberi_uguali 
@mara_carfagna @PaoloGentiloni @ale_dibattista 
  
  
                                           
291 Gephi is an open-source network analysis and visualization software package. 
292 It is an algorithm for detecting communities in networks. 
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7.1 List of the Most Influential News Outlets per Area 
Using the same procedure described a set of about 2500 active supporters has been 
identified (about 500 for each political area). 
Then the timelines of these supporters have been examined in order to retrieve all the links 
they had shared during the period under exam (January / March 2018). The so collected 
links, grouped by source, have been associated to the political areas supported by the 
selected accounts. 
 
7.2 Most Influential Media Outlets per Area 
The data obtained has been used as baseline. They have been filtered on a per-user basis 
using two different criteria:  
1. the first table includes the media sources most shared by the prominent accounts 
present in the root set. 
2. The second table includes the media sources most shared by accounts with more than 5000 
followers. 
 
7.3 Most Relevant Topics per Week  
The tweets obtained from the monitoring process were grouped by day and week and 
subsequently used as input293 for a Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA)294 – a bottom-up 
topic detection tool. The main objective was to obtain a list of topics that were 
discussed along the timeline of the pre-election period and their evolution. We tested 
different settings for the system, with regard to the number of iterations for the model 
training, the topics to split the data into and number of terms to consider in the 
description of the topic.  These dimensions must be specified prior to running the 
algorithm. The best setting was obtained for 30 topics, described by 100 words, 
obtained through 200 iterations of the algorithm.  
The topics were then identified and labelled through manual inspection. 
 
7.4 Trends on General Keywords Corresponding to Known Narratives 
An analysis of the trends present in different areas was performed by matching the keywords 
and keyword combinations pertaining to those areas. The analysis of these trends was done 
both on the entire set of tweets, as well as on the set of tweets corresponding to the users 
whose political affinity could be inferred. The following keyword combinations were used for 
each of the topics: 
                                           
293 The original tweets went through a pre-processing stage, where they were lower cased, where stop words, as 
well as all non-alphanumeric signs, were removed.  
294 David M. Blei, Andrew Y. Ng, Michael I. Jordan, Latent Dirichlet Allocation, Journal of Machine Learning Research, 
vol. 3, 2003. 
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 Migration (immigrati; rifugiati; clandestini; sbarchi+clandestini; sbarchi+immigrati; 
sbarchi+migranti; sbarchi+africani; ong+migranti; ong+taxi; ong+immigrati; 
ong+clandestini; immigrati+malattie; clandestini+malattie; iussoli; boldrini);  
 Europe (eu; europa; commissione europea; noeuro; juncker; mogherini; merkel; euro) ;  
 Vaccination (vaccini; case+farmaceutiche);  
 Financial System (banche; risparmiatori; Etruria; consip; soros; negozi+chiusi, 
negozi+domenica). 
 
7.5 Trends on General Keywords Corresponding to Known "Fake Stories"  
An analysis of the trends corresponding to known "fake stories" was performed by matching the 
keywords and keyword combinations pertaining to those areas. The analysis of these trends 
was done both on the entire set of tweets, as well as on the set of tweets corresponding to the 
users whose political affinity could be inferred. The following keyword combinations were used 
for each of these stories: 
 
 sacchetti+spesa (January);  
 Trenitalia+biglietto (February);  
 Macerata+Mastropietro (February);  
 Sicilia+schede+pd (March);  
 "Mentre i profughi stanno negli hotel a tre stelle, guardate in che condizioni sono i 
terremotati" (February);  
 pensione+reversibilitá (February);  
 bambini+imparino+arabo (January);  
 padoan+INPS+muoiono+tardi;  
 pd+antimafia+idagata+mafia+paolino;  
 italiani+caritas+aiutiamo+immigrati. 
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8. Conclusions and Recommendations 
Production of misleading or false content is not limited to the current historical context, but has 
always been inherent in human communication. In times of socio-political crisis, as those 
induced by globalisation and rapid technological change, the whole social fabric weakens, and 
widely accepted institutions appear unable to abide by the social contract and respond to 
citizens' needs for security and prosperity.295 This weakness exposes society’s vulnerabilities 
and makes it susceptible to hostile intrusion and attacks.  
Technological advances have provided producers and sharer of distorted information with new 
powerful means to reach an ever-wider audience. Social networks, in fact, are able to attract 
and engage with millions of people by giving them a platform where disinformation can spread 
exponentially fast, often being uncritically picked-up and redistributed to an even larger 
audience by the traditional media. 
Since the beginning of the century, Russia has allegedly used cyber-attacks, disinformation, and 
financial influence campaigns to meddle with the internal affairs of most European 
countries.296 The Russian practice is based firstly on the correlation between the strength of 
each country’s institutions and its susceptibility to Russian influence. Thus, the strategy may 
vary depending on the targeted country: Russia commonly acts to exert influence over pliant 
governments or weaken pro-Western leaders in former Soviet controlled countries, while in the 
rest of Europe it would continue to undermine NATO and the EU, by amplifying existing political 
and social discord.   
Hostile narratives, targeting exposed vulnerabilities with emotionally charged contents, are 
designed to erode trust in mainstream media and democratic institutions. They feed people 
with true and false information, thoroughly organised per theme. They are primarily focused on 
social issues and encourage cross-platform sharing to create content that has the potential to 
go viral and reach mass audiences. Topics are presented in order to reinforce community and 
cultural pride, exploiting tribalism within each targeted community, in particular preceding 
electoral events.  
It is thus not surprising that elections have become a target for hybrid-warfare. Although the 
electoral voting systems have not been compromised yet, attacks against auxiliary services 
have been attempted in some countries.297 For the reasons discussed in this report, deterrence, 
citizens’ awareness and media literacy offer a more convincing approach than relying on police 
enforcement alone. In fact, certain measures to mitigate the negative effects of disinformation 
- e.g. raising awareness among the population when an attack is in progress and exposing the 
tools, techniques and intentions of such campaigns - have been proven to be somehow 
                                           
295 Daudi Mwita Nyamaka, Social Contract Theory of John Locke (1932-1704) in the Contemporary World, St. 
Augustine University Law Journal, 2001, Vol. 1 Issue 1. 
296 Clint Watts, So What Did We Learn? Looking Back on Four Years of Russia’s Cyber-Enabled “Active Measures”, 
Alliance for Securing Democracy, 18 January 2018. 
297 NIS Cooperation Group, Compendium on Cyber Security of Election Technology, CG Publication 03/2018. 
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effective in Northern Europe.298 In this sense, it could be argued that the lack of awareness of 
being exposed to disinformation can be considered a vulnerability itself, in the same way as the 
lack of a coordinated response when aware of being exposed to disinformation. 
Building up on the existing initiatives taken by the European institutions and member states 
against disinformation, a set of three mutually reinforcing policy options is proposed, 
addressing: 
 Monitoring Hostile Narratives. Disinformation has been incorporated into complex 
hybrid-warfare strategies. For this reason, a systematic monitoring of hostile narratives, 
aimed at better identifying and addressing exposed citizens' vulnerabilities, their scope 
and distribution, is of the utmost importance. The information gathered in this way 
could be used to build a "Hostile Narratives Index", which will help to measure and 
compare different vulnerabilities, providing a basis to develop more precise and 
targeted actions. 
 Regulating “Personalisation Algorithms”. Online platforms thrived in an unregulated 
environment. Personalised content and related use of targeted advertising, originally 
conceived for commercial purposes, has proven to be instrumental in forging a specific 
realities for each user by subtly shaping customised “information diets” and worldviews 
(e.g. creation of online echo chambers, discriminatory content against particular social 
groups, information asymmetries between service providers and consumers, etc.). The 
amount of false and misleading content and relative narratives spread may be reduced 
shifting from the current "visibility reward model" to a "quality reward model", by 
providing non-personalised results when it comes to specific topics (e.g. science, 
elections, politics, etc.). This would make it more expensive to reach a precise target 
audience, and thus disempower hostile narratives that could not rely anymore on 
tailored data. While much of these concerns are simply the result of rapid technological 
change, this must not prevent regulatory interventions aimed at safeguarding the rights 
and legal protections that citizens are entitled to. This needs to be accompanied by 
clear mechanisms of accountability due to the opaque nature of personalisation 
algorithms and their potential to generate consequences that are detrimental to society 
on a number of levels, as sketched out in this report. 
 Authenticating Cryptographic Content. Technology has made possible to fabricate 
manipulated content nearly indistinguishable from “ground truth”. Deep fakes, a new AI-
based technology, allow essentially anyone to create, for instance, lifelike videos of 
politicians or influential people saying or doing things they have never said or done.299 
Online content may then be digitally signed with a cryptographic key embedded into the 
file metadata to be later decrypted by browsers or platforms, making it also inspectable 
by regulators or the general public. This would certify the originating source and help to 
ensure more transparency and enhance trustworthiness of published material. 
                                           
298 Chloe Colliver, Peter Pomerantsev, Anne Applebaum, Jonathan Birdwell, Smearing Sweden: International 
Influence Campaigns in the 2018 Swedish Election, London,  ISD, 2018. 
299 Brian Klaas, Deepfakes are coming. We’re not ready, Washington Post, 14 May 2019. 
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Although it may sound like a truism, it is important to recall that any expert understanding of 
emotional manipulation and distorted perceptions is unlikely to be effective in fending off 
disinformation unless it is combined with concerted and sustained efforts to promote 
awareness raising, community engagement, empowerment, and education, including media and 
'algorithmic literacy'. In rapidly and dynamically evolving environments, increasing citizens' 
resilience against malicious attacks is, ultimately, of paramount importance to protect our open 
democratic societies, social values and individual rights and freedoms. 
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